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If men were angels, no government would be necessary.  
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary.  In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the gov-
ernment to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 






This Article is about deferred action and transparency in related 
immigration cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  While scholars from other genres have 
written extensively on the topic of prosecutorial discretion, the sub-
ject is largely absent from immigration scholarship, with the excep-
tion of early research conducted by Leon Wildes in the late 1970s 
and early 2000s,
2
 and a law review article I published in 2010 outlin-
  
    1.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 286 (James Madison) (Scott ed., 2002). 
 2. See Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: 
Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1980) [herein-
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ing the origins of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law and 
related lessons that can be drawn from administrative law and crimi-
nal law.
3
  That article ends with specific recommendations for the 
agency, such as codifying deferred action into a regulation and rec-
ognizing it as a formal benefit as opposed to a matter of “administra-
tive convenience,” and streamlining the array of existing memoranda 
of prosecutorial discretion floating within each DHS agency.
4
  An 
additional recommendation included increasing oversight of prose-
cutorial discretion to ensure that officers and agencies that fail to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion by targeting and enforcing the laws 
against low-priority individuals are held accountable. 
In this Article, and building upon recommendations published in 
The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law,
5
 I de-
scribe the state of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in par-
ticular by surveying the political climate, public reaction, and advo-
  
after Wildes, The Operations Instructions]; Leon Wildes, The United States Immi-
gration Service v. John Lennon: The Cultural Lag, 40 BROOK. L. REV. 279 (1974); 
Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1977) [hereinafter Wildes, The Litigative Use of the 
FOIA]; Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service - A Measure of the Attorney General’s Concern for Aliens, Part I, 
53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 25 (January 26, 1976) [hereinafter Wildes, The 
Nonpriority Program Part I]; Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service - A Measure of the Attorney General’s Con-
cern for Aliens, Part II, 53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 33 (January 30, 1976) [herein-
after Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Part II]; Leon Wildes, The Deferred Ac-
tion Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: A Possible 
Remedy for Impossible Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819 (2004) [hereinafter Wil-
des, A Possible Remedy]. 
 3. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigra-
tion Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010). 
 4. ICE prefaced its most recent memorandum on prosecutorial discretion as 
building upon the pre-existing memoranda.  See John Morton, Exercising Prosecu-
torial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of 
the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter Morton 
Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. 
 5. See Wadhia, supra note 3, at 293–99. 
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cacy efforts in the last two years.  I also chronicle my repeated Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to DHS for information 
about deferred action, and the stumbling blocks I encountered during 
this 19-month journey.  The Article will show that while deferred 
action is one of the very few discretionary remedies available for 
noncitizens with compelling equities, it currently operates as a secret 
program accessible only to elite lawyers and advocates.  Moreover, 
the secrecy of the program has created the (mis)perception by some, 
that deferred action can be used as a tool to legalize the undocu-
mented immigrant population or ignore congressional will.  This 
Article explains why transparency about deferred action is important 
and makes related recommendations that include, but are not limited 
to, subjecting the program to rulemaking under the Administrative 
Procedures Act, issuing written decisions when deferred action is 
denied, posting information about the application process, and main-
taining statistics about deferred action decisions.  Without these 
remedies, noncitizens that possess similarly relevant equities will 
face unequal hardships. 
A. Background  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinet-level 
agency with jurisdiction over many immigration functions.
6
  The 
Department has jurisdiction over immigration “services” such as 
asylum, citizenship, and green card applications;
7
 border-related en-
forcement actions such as border patrol and inspections;
8
 and interior 
enforcement activities, such as the detention and removal of nonciti-
zens.
9
  The immigration court system is called the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (EOIR) and rests within the Department of 
  
 6. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm (last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
 7. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
 8. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/ (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
 9. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/ 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
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Justice.
10
  Removal proceedings are initiated by DHS and operate as 
adversarial hearings at which U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement attorneys represent the DHS.  On the other hand, nonciti-
zens are entitled to find their own lawyers at no expense to the gov-
ernment.
11
  Many noncitizens in removal proceedings are unrepre-
sented because the proceeding itself is considered “civil” and with-
out guaranteed safeguards like court-appointed counsel.
12
  At a re-
moval proceeding, an Immigration Judge reviews allegations and 
charges with the noncitizen defendant, as well as enters pleas.
13
  If 
appropriate, the Immigration Judge presides over applications for 
relief from removal such as asylum, adjustment of status, and cancel-
lation of removal.
14
  The noncitizen bears the burden of proving that 
she is eligible for such relief.
15
  Decisions by the Immigration Judge 
may be appealed with the Board of Immigration Appeals.
16
  Not eve-
ry noncitizen residing or entering the United States without legal 
authority is placed in removal proceedings.
17
  Some are removed 
expeditiously by the Department through other means, while others 




 10. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ (last visited July 17, 2011). 
 
 11. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006). 
 12. For a more detailed look at noncitizens’ lack of representation, see Donald 
Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, 2 INSIGHT (MIGRATION 
POLICY INSTITUTE) (Apr. 2005), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf; Andrew I. Shoenholtz 
& Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent 
Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55–56 (2008). 
 13. See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last visited Aug. 
9, 2011). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See U. S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/ReliefFromRemoval.htm (last visit-
ed Dec. 30, 2011). 
 16. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, supra note 13. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Note that this background section is intended as a brief review of the De-
partment of Homeland Security and the removal process.  For a more detailed 
discussion of the removal process and the agency components involved, see Wad-
hia, supra note 3.  For an organizational chart listing the different components of 
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A favorable exercise of “prosecutorial discretion” identifies the 
Department of Homeland Security’s authority to not assert the full 
scope of the agency’s enforcement authority in each and every 
case.
19
  The Department’s motivations for exercising prosecutorial 
discretion are largely economic and humanitarian.
20
  According to 
the agency’s own statistics, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) has the resources to remove less than 4% of the total undocu-
mented population.
21
  Moreover, many individuals and groups who 
present redeeming qualities such as lengthy residence, employment 
or family ties in the United States, and/or intellectual, military, or 
professional promise are living in the United States, vulnerable to 
immigration enforcement and without a statutory vehicle for legal 
status.  In the first two years of the Obama Administration, such hu-
manitarian cases have swelled in the wake of congressional stale-
mates over even discrete immigration reforms.  At one time, prose-
cutorial discretion was called “nonpriority” and later “deferred ac-
tion,” but today, prosecutorial discretion is associated with many 
  
DHS and a description of each, see Organizational Chart, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011). 
 19. See, e.g., Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 5; 
memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, on Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 2, 8 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Howard Memo], available at 
http://www.shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration2005.pdf; 
memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, 2 (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Meissner Memo], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092970/INS-
Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00; memorandum 
from John Morton, Director, Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, 4 (March 2, 2011 ) [hereinafter 
Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities], available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf; memo-
randum from John Morton, Director, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, 
Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memo on Certain 
Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf; memorandum from Julie L. Myers, As-
sistant Secretary, Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion, 4 (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file 
with author);  
 20. Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 1. 
 21. Id. 
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different actions by the government.
22
  For example, a DHS officer 
can exercise favorable discretion by granting a temporary stay of 
removal, joining in a motion to terminate removal proceedings, 
granting an order of supervision, cancelling a Notice to Appear, or 
granting deferred action.
23
  Prosecutorial discretion can also be exer-
cised during different points in the enforcement process, including, 




This Article is limited to the Department’s exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion and deferred action in particular.  This Article does 
not discuss immigration adjudications before DHS (beyond deferred 
action) or the EOIR.  Notably, many scholars have written extensive-
ly about immigration adjudications in these contexts.
25
  On the other 
hand, I rely on process values that have been analyzed in other im-
migration adjudicatory contexts to analyze and advance the im-
portance of transparency in deferred action. 
B. Summary of Deferred Action Process 
In theory, any person who is in the United States without author-
ization may apply for deferred action before any component of DHS, 
including CBP, ICE, and USCIS.  Oft-times deferred action requests 
are reviewed by a local office, and following up to three levels of 
review, are either granted, denied, or unresolved.
26
  There is no for-
  
  22. Wildes, A Possible Remedy, supra note 2, at 820-23; see Morton Memo on 
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 2; Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 2; 
Howard Memo, supra note 19, at 2.  
 23. See Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 2; Howard 
Memo, supra note 19, at 2; Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 2. 
 24. See Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note4, at 2; Howard 
Memo, supra note 19, at 2; Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 2. 
 25. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication 
Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009); Steven Legomsky, Restructuring Im-
migration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L. J. 1635 (2010); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent 
Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13-1 
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1, 3 (2008).  
 26. See, e.g., Ombudsman Recommendation: Recommendations on USCIS De-
ferred Action Processing, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (July 11, 
2011), http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/cisomb-recommendation.shtm (citing 
the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 442(c), 116 
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mal deferred action application form or fee.  Upon receiving de-
ferred action, the person may remain in the United States and may 
apply for work authorization unless, and until, the agency decides to 
target the person for enforcement under the immigration laws.
27
  
Specifically, the regulations governing immigration contain a specif-
ic subsection for individuals applying for work authorization on the 
basis of deferred action.
28
  If a person is denied deferred action, there 
is no mechanism for review by the Department or the immigration 
court, nor is there a guarantee that the person will receive a notifica-
tion about the Department’s decision.29  Because deferred action is a 
function of prosecutorial discretion, decisions are generally immune 
from judicial review in the absence of equal protection claims in-
volving “outrageous discrimination.”30  Moreover, decisions about 
deferred action often rest with one agency and in many cases non-
attorney employees of the Department, despite the fact that grave 
consequences attach when an agency fails to consider or denies a 
person deferred action status.
31
  As of this writing, the Department 
does not keep public records about deferred action grants, nor does it 
  
Stat. 2135, 2194); Department of Homeland Security  Secretary Tom Ridge, Dele-
gation to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Mar. 1, 2003) (del-
egating authority to grant voluntary departure under section 240B of the INA 8 
U.S.C. § 1229c, and deferred action). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2011) (“An alien who has been granted de-
ferred action, an act of administrative convenience to the government which gives 
some cases lower priority, if the alien establishes an economic necessity for em-
ployment . . . .”).  
 29. While the June 17 memorandum from DHS on prosecutorial discretion in-
cludes some additional procedures that would include a case to be initiated by the 
ICE officer, private attorney, or ICE agent, it does not appear to include a specific 
method for notifying the noncitizen when they have been denied deferred action.  
See Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4. 
 30. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 
(1999). 
 31. Notably, the June 17, 2011 Morton Memo on prosecutorial discretion enables 
ICE attorneys to review the charging decisions by ICE, CBP, and USCIS.  See 
Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 3.  By including and 
amplifying the role of the ICE attorney, the memo includes an important and new 
check to the deferred action process before ICE and prosecutorial discretion gen-
erally.  See id. 
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make information about the program available on its website, forms, 
or memoranda. 
II. DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
A. Operations Instruction and Meissner Memo 
Two seminal policy statements on deferred action that have sur-
vived enormous structural changes of the immigration agency and 
immigration statute include a former “Operations Instruction” on 
deferred action, and a memorandum published by former INS Com-
missioner Doris Meissner.
32
  The Operations Instruction (O.I.) was 
revealed in the 1970s in connection with litigation filed on behalf of 
John Lennon.  That now-defunct Operations Instruction advises of-
ficers to consider: 
(1) advanced or tender age; (2) many years' presence 
in the United States; (3) physical or mental condition 
requiring care or treatment in the United States; (4) 
family situation in the United States—effect of expul-
sion; (5) criminal, immoral or subversive activities or 
affiliations.  If the district director's recommendation 
is approved by the regional commissioner the alien 
shall be notified that no action will be taken by the 
Service to disturb his immigration status, or that his 
departure from the United States has been deferred 
indefinitely, whichever is appropriate.
33
   
That Operations Instruction was the subject of significant court-
room traffic beginning in the late 1970s that revolved around wheth-
er deferred action operates as a substantive benefit or an act of pure 
administrative convenience.
34
  Concluding that the O.I. on deferred 
  
 32. Meissner Memo, supra note 19; (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Operations Instructions, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975). 
 33. (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operations Instructions, 
O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975). 
 34. See Velasco-Gutierrez v. Crossland, 732 F.2d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 1984); 
Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 661 (11th Cir. 1983); Nicholas v. Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979); Soon Bok Yoon v. 
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action operated like a substantive benefit, the Ninth Circuit in Nicho-
las v. INS articulated the five criteria listed in the O.I., the directive 
language of the O.I., and the fact that a grant of deferred action pro-
vided the benefit of “an indefinite delay in deportation.”35  From the 
agency’s point of view, the tension of what to call deferred action 
(administrative convenience or substantial benefit) was eliminated 
with a tweaking of the O.I. in 1981 and more explicit language in 
future memoranda including the Meissner Memo.
36
   
Published in 2000, the Meissner memo identifies a list of exam-
ples of factors that should be considered by immigration officers in 
making prosecutorial decisions like deferred action, including, but 
not limited to: 
 immigration status of the applicant;  
 length of residence in the United States;  
 criminal history and circumstances surrounding 
such history;  
 humanitarian concerns such as family times, ten-
der age at the time of entry into the United States, 
special medical conditions or conditions and cir-
cumstances in the country to which the benefi-
ciary could be potentially removed; likelihood of 
being removed;  
 current or past cooperation with law enforcement;  
  
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1976); Lennon 
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975); Wan 
Chung Wen v. Ferro, 543 F. Supp. 1016, 1017–18 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Zacharakis 
v. Howerton, 517 F. Supp. 1026, 1027–28 (S.D. Fla. 1981); see also Siverts v. 
Craig, 602 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Haw. 1985) (construing 1981 instruction). 
 35. Nicholas, 590 F.2d at 806–807.  
 36. The relevant part of the amended instruction reads “Deferred action.  The 
district director may, at his discretion, recommend consideration of deferred ac-
tion, an act of administrative choice to give some cases lower priority and in no 
way an entitlement, in appropriate cases . . . .”  (Legacy) Immigration and Natural-
ization Service, Operations Instructions, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1981).  Despite the 
disclaimers placed in the amended O.I. and subsequent memoranda, the data be-
low combined with the agency’s continued application of deferred action based on 
specific factors present a strong argument for recognizing deferred action as a 
substantive benefit.   
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 service in the U.S. military; immigration history; 
and  
 likelihood that she could be eligible for a legal 
immigration status in the future among other fac-
tors.
37
   
B. Morton Memoranda 
In the last two years, the immigration agency has published addi-
tional guidance about its authority to exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion.
38
  In June 2010, ICE issued a broad memorandum about its 
“Civil Enforcement Priorities” and limited resources, highlighting 
the importance of prosecutorial discretion during the apprehension, 
detention, and removal of noncitizens.
39
  The memo reaffirms earlier 
memoranda on prosecutorial discretion and further states “Particular 
care should be given when dealing with lawful permanent residents, 
juveniles, and the immediate family members of U.S. citizens.”40  In 
  
 37. Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
  38.   For a detailed description of memoranda and policy about prosecutorial 
discretion prior to 2010, see Wadhia, supra note 3. 
  39. Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 1. EOIR 
highlighted the relationship between implementation of the June 2010 Morton 
Memo and an increased detained docket at EOIR.  Immigration Court System: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of 
Juan P. Osuna, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2011/EOIRtestimony05182011.pdf (“As DHS 
enforcement programs reach their full potential, EOIR is planning ahead and shift-
ing resources to meet the anticipated corresponding increase in the agency’s de-
tained caseload.”).  Note that Morton’s June 30, 2010 memo on Civil Enforcement 
priorities was reissued by ICE on March 2, 2011, with one additional clause at the 
end to confirm that the memo itself did not create any right or benefit or limit the 
legal authority of ICE to enforce immigration laws.  See Morton Memo on Civil 
Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 4 (“These guidelines and priorities are 
not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, 
civil, or criminal matter.”). 
  40.   Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 4.  For an 
in-depth analysis of the June 30 Morton memo, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Reading the Morton Memo: Federal Priorities and Prosecutorial Discretion, 
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER-AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 46-
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June 2011, ICE issued another memorandum on prosecutorial discre-
tion that was intended to support the Morton Memo on Civil En-
forcement Priorities and also build upon many of the historic policy 
memoranda by INS and DHS on the subject of prosecutorial discre-
tion.
41
  The broad Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion con-
tains a tone similar to previous memoranda in that it identifies the 
resource limitations of the agency, furnishes a laundry list of largely 
humanitarian factors that ICE may consider in deciding whether or 
not to assert the full scope of enforcement authority available to ICE, 
and “clarifies” that the directive itself confers no right to the nonciti-
zen or limitation on the agency to apprehend, detain, or remove 
“any” alien unlawfully within the United States.42  The factors post-
ed for consideration by ICE include, but are not limited to: 
 
 the agency's civil immigration enforcement priori-
ties;  
 the person's length of presence in the United 
States, with particular consideration given to 
presence while in lawful status;  
 the circumstances of the person's arrival in the 
United States and the manner of his or her entry, 
particularly if the alien came to the United States 
as a young child;  
  
2010 (2010) [hereinafter Wadhia, Reading the Morton Memo], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723165. 
 41. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 1. ICE issued a 
second memorandum on prosecutorial discretion specific to certain victims, wit-
nesses, and plaintiffs.  See Morton Memo on Certain Victims, Witnesses, and 
Plaintiffs, supra note 19.  This memo highlights the importance of exercising 
prosecutorial discretion towards:  
victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other serious 
crimes; witnesses involved in pending criminal investigations or 
prosecutions; plaintiffs in non-frivolous lawsuits regarding civil 
rights or liberties violations; and individuals engaging in a pro-
tected activity related to civil or other rights who may be in a 
non-frivolous dispute with an employer, landlord, or contractor.   
Id. at 2.  That memo also states somewhat conclusively “[I]t is against ICE policy 
to initiate removal proceedings against an individual known to be the immediate 
victim or witness to a crime.”  Id. at 1. 
 42. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 4, 6. 
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 the person's pursuit of education in the United 
States, with particular consideration given to 
those who have graduated from a U.S. high 
school or have successfully pursued or are pursu-
ing a college or advanced degrees at a legitimate 
institution of higher education in the United 
States;  
 whether the person, or the person's immediate rel-
ative, has served in the U.S. military, reserves, or 
national guard, with particular consideration given 
to those who served in combat;  
 the person's criminal history, including arrests, 
prior convictions, or outstanding arrest warrants;  
 the person's immigration history, including any 
prior removal, outstanding order of removal, prior 
denial of status, or evidence of fraud;  
 whether the person poses a national security or 
public safety concern;  
 the person's ties and contributions to the commu-
nity, including family relationships;  
 the person's ties to the home country and condi-
tion in the country;  
 the person's age, with particular consideration 
given to minors and the elderly;  
 whether the person has a U.S. citizen or perma-
nent resident spouse, child, or parent;  
 whether the person is the primary caretaker of a 
person with a mental or physical disability, minor, 
or seriously ill relative;   
 whether the person or the person's spouse is preg-
nant or nursing;  
 whether the person or the person's spouse suffers 
from severe mental or physical illness;  
 whether the person's nationality renders removal 
unlikely;  
 whether the person is likely to be granted tempo-
rary or permanent status or other relief from re-
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moval, including as a relative of a U.S. citizen or 
permanent resident;  
 whether the person is likely to be granted tempo-
rary or permanent status or other relief from re-
moval, including as an asylum seeker, or a victim 
of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other 
crime; and  
 whether the person is currently cooperating or has 
cooperated with federal, state or local law en-
forcement authorities, such as ICE, the U.S Attor-
neys or Department of Justice, the Department of 





The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion also articulates 
that “particular care” should be given to the following classes of in-
dividuals:  
 
 veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces 
 long-time lawful permanent residents 
 minors and elderly individuals  
 individuals present in the United States since 
childhood 
 pregnant and nursing women  
 victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or other 
serious crimes 
 individuals who suffer from serious mental or 
physical disability; and  
 individuals with serious health conditions.44 
 
  
  43.   Id. at 4. 
  44.   Id. at 5.  For a detailed analysis about the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial 
Discretion, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Morton Memo and Prosecutorial 
Discretion: An Overview, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, 6 (July 20, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/morton-memo-and-
prosecutorial-discretion-overview-0. 
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The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion is somewhat 
unique from previous memoranda in that it explicates who within 
ICE has authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion and the special 
role of ICE attorneys to “exercise prosecutorial discretion in any 
immigration removal proceeding before EOIR” including any re-
moval proceedings that have been proposed by CBP or USCIS.
45
  
Rather than relying on the initial charging agency’s decision to issue 
an NTA, the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion suggests that 
the ICE Chief Counsel or Deputy Director for ICE should handle 
any conflicts that arise between the charging agency and the ICE 
trial attorney seeking to exercise prosecutorial discretion.
46
   
C. Other ICE Policies 
ICE also released a “toolkit” for U.S. Prosecutors in April 2011, 
which contains a separate section on prosecutorial discretion and the 
related tools of deferred action and administrative stays of removal.
47
  
In describing the concept of deferred action, the toolkit advises: 
Deferred Action (DA) is not a specific form of relief 
but rather a term used to describe the decision-making 
authority of ICE to allocate resources in the best pos-
sible manner to focus on high priority cases, poten-
tially deferring action on cases with a lower priority.  
There is no statutory definition of DA, but federal 
regulations provide a description: “[D]eferred action 
[is] ‘an act of administrative convenience to the gov-
ernment which gives some cases lower priority. . . .’”  
There are two distinct types of DA requests: (i) those 
seeking DA based on sympathetic facts and a low-
enforcement priority, and (ii) those seeking DA based 
on his/her status as an important witness in an inves-
tigation or prosecution.  Basically, DA means the 
  
 45. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 3. 
 46. Id.  For a more detailed analysis of the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, see Wadhia, supra note 44, at 5. 
 47. Protecting the Homeland: Toolkit for Prosecutors, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 4–8 (2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/osltc/pdf/tool-kit-for-prosecutors.pdf. 
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government has decided that it is not in its interest to 
arrest, charge, prosecute or remove an individual at 
that time for a specific, articulable reason.
48
  
The enforcement activities of ICE bear a direct relationship to 
the activities undertaken by the immigration court system, housed 
within the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration 
Review.
49
  EOIR assumes jurisdiction of immigration cases once a 
Notice to Appear (NTA) is filed with the immigration court.
50
  A 
wide array of Department employees have the authority to assemble 
a NTA, which in and of itself raises concerns about the quality and 
consistency of NTA issuance.  According to recent data calculated 
by the American Bar Association: 
The number of Notices to Appear (NTA) issued by 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to initi-
ate removal proceedings grew by 36% in just two 
years, from 213,887 in FY 2006 to 291,217 in FY 
2008.  These numbers are expected to increase as 
DHS focuses on apprehending and removing all crim-
inal noncitizens, such as through the Secure Commu-
nities initiative.
51
   
In addition, and in response to an overwhelmed immigration 
court system, ICE published guidance for dismissing select cases 
before EOIR where a benefit such as a marriage-based green card 
could be conferred by USCIS.
52
  Specifically, the memo advises the 
  
 48. Id. at 4 (citations omitted). 
 49. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
(last visited July 17, 2011). 
 50. See Jurisdiction and Commencement of Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.14 (2011) (“(a) Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration 
Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court 
by the Service. . . .”). 
 51. Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration Court System: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of 
Karen T. Grisez, American Bar Association), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/2011/2011may18_gri
sezs_t.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 52. Memorandum from John Morton on Guidance Regarding the Handling of 
Removal Proceedings of Aliens with Pending or Approved Applications or Peti-
 
File: Wadhia - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V2 Created on: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM Last Printed: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM 
2012 DEFERRED ACTION AND IMMIGRATION LAW 17 
ICE Office of Chief Counsel to “dismiss” removal cases before the 
immigration court involving “adjustment of status” (green card) cas-
es in which the applicant appears eligible for a green card.  The pur-
pose of this guidance is to reduce the number of cases pending at the 
EOIR.
53
  The need for operationalizing a policy dismissing cases in 
which the noncitizen is eligible for an immigration benefit before the 
United States was underscored by EOIR Director Juan Osuna’s re-
cent recitation about the current number of cases pending at EOIR. 
At the end of FY 2010, EOIR’s immigration courts 
had 262,622 proceedings pending, marking an in-
crease of more than 40,000 proceedings pending over 
  
tions, 2–4 (Aug. 20, 2010), available at www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/aliens-pending-applications.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 3.  The relevant section of that memo states: 
As a matter of prosecutorial discretion and to promote the effi-
cient use of government resources, I hereby issue new ICE poli-
cy to govern the handling of removal proceedings involving al-
iens with applications or petitions pending with USCIS.  This 
policy extends both to the prosecution of removal proceedings 
by OCCs and to any associated detention decisions by Enforce-
ment and Removal Operations (ERO). 
. . . 
Where there is an underlying application or petition and ICE de-
termines in the exercise of discretion that a non-detained indi-
vidual appears eligible for relief from removal, OCC should 
promptly move to dismiss proceedings without prejudice before 
EOIR. 
. . . 
Only removal cases that meet the following criteria will be con-
sidered for dismissal:  
The alien must be the subject of an application or petition filed 
with USCIS to include a current priority date, if required, for ad-
justment of status; 
The alien appears eligible for relief as a matter of law and in the 
exercise of discretion;  
The alien must present a completed Application 10 Register 
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form 1-485), if required; 
and  
The alien beneficiary must be statutorily eligible for adjustment 
of status (a waiver must be available for any ground of inadmis-
sibility). 
Id. at 2–3. 
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the end of FY 2009.  In the first half of FY 2011, that 
pending caseload grew by an additional 9,400.  This 
caseload is directly tied to annual increases in cases 
filed in the immigration courts by DHS.  In FY 2010, 
the immigration courts received 325,326 proceedings.  
By contrast, in FY 2007, proceedings received were 
279,430.
54
   
III. THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION AND DEFERRED ACTION 
A. Legislative Stalemates and Deferred Action  
The 2009–11 legislative debate on immigration helps demon-
strate the political context under which deferred action has been 
spotlighted.
55
  Efforts by select members of Congress, attorneys, and 
pro-immigration advocates to advance broad immigration reforms 
were unsuccessful despite the promise proffered by the Obama Ad-
ministration in 2008.
56
  In December 2010, the Senate failed to move 
  
 54. See Statement of Juan P. Osuna, supra note 39, at 2.  In response to the 
swelling court docket and recent Morton Memos, the American Bar Association 
has further recommended that: 
DHS personnel should be encouraged to reduce the burden on 
the removal adjudication system by exercising discretion to not 
serve a Notice to Appear on noncitizens who are prima facie eli-
gible for relief from removal, to concede eligibility for relief 
from removal after receipt of a clearly meritorious application, 
to stop litigating a case after key facts develop that make remov-
al unlikely, or to waive appeal in certain appropriate types of 
cases. 
Statement of Karen T. Grisez, supra note 51, at 7.  It should also be noted, the new 
Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion and its focus on the role of ICE trial 
attorneys when appearing before EOIR in removal proceedings has the potential to 
reduce the docket at EOIR, especially if the memo becomes a tool for the ICE trial 
attorney to join in motions to terminate or dismiss cases that are not among the 
priorities identified by ICE. 
 55. This article does not attempt to analyze “why legislative reform has failed” 
nor does it suggest that prosecutorial discretion can ever be a substitute for such 
reforms. 
 56. Immigration Policy: Transition Blueprint, OBAMA-BIDEN TRANSITION 
PROJECT, 20–21 (2008), available at http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx? 
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forward on the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Mi-
nors Act (DREAM Act), a bill that would have provided legal status 
to eligible young residents who have been in the United States for an 
extended period of time, finished high school, and plan to enter col-
lege; after several years in “conditional” resident status, the DREAM 
Act would have enabled young people who have completed higher 
education or service in the military to achieve permanent residence 
in the United States.
57
  To many advocates, the failure of the 
DREAM Act was symbolic of an Administration with little will and, 
more importantly, a Congress unwilling to put the policy of regular-
izing status for arguably the most sympathetic population in the 
United States, namely, young people with great intellectual promise 
whose immigration status was beyond their control, before politics.
58
  
Weeks later, the 112th Congress opened up with a cadre of congres-
sional members at the National Press Club highlighting the benefits 
of repealing birthright citizenship.
59
  That Congress was willing to 
renounce children and infants, speaks volumes to the political land-
scape on “the Hill” with respect to the immigration question.60  
Whereas President Obama has made public announcements and 
  
docid=27611&linkid=188816.  For a longer discussion about previous efforts to 
enact legislative reform, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Policy and Politics of 
Immigrants’ Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 410–18 (2007). 
 57. See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010, S. 
3992, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN03992:; Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors Act of 2010, H.R. 6497, 111th Cong. (2010), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR06497:. 
 58. See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Democrats Push DREAM Act; Critics Call It Amnes-
ty, NPR.ORG (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/06/131796206/ 
democrats-push-dream-act-critics-call-it-amnesty. 
 59. Julia Preston, State Lawmakers Outline Plans to End Birthright Citizenship, 
Drawing Outcry, NY TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/ 
06/us/06immig.html. 
 60. See, e.g., Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, H.R. 140, 112th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr140ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr140ih.pdf; Marc Lacey, Birthright Citizenship 
Looms as Next Immigration Battle, NY TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/us/politics/05babies.html; Washington Post 
Staff, DREAM Act delayed in Senate: Prospects of cloture by year's end fading, 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 9, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/ 2010/12/09/AR2010120903504.html. 
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hosted a handful of stakeholder meetings about the importance of 
comprehensive immigration reform, the outcome as of this writing 
has not led to any serious proposal by Congress about reforming 
immigration holistically, a legislative scheme that in past years has 
included a statutory update to the family and employment-based 
immigration system, a legal pathway for noncitizens to enter the 
United States in the future on the basis of work or a family relation-
ship, and a registration program that enables individuals and other 
special populations such as high school students and migrant work-
ers currently in the United States without authorization to come be-
fore the government and apply for a legal visa.
61
 
Meanwhile, staff members of USCIS circulated an internal draft 
memorandum outlining potential ways in which the agency could 
reprieve individuals and certain classes of persons who are ineligible 
for legal immigration status, but who nonetheless exhibit compelling 
qualities or equities.
62
  In discussing deferred action, that memoran-
dum acknowledged that it could be used as a tool to protect certain 
individuals or groups from the threat of removal.
63
 
USCIS can increase the use of deferred action.  De-
ferred action is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
  
 61. For a sampling of President Obama’s public discussion about comprehensive 
immigration reform, see David Jackson, Obama talks immigration with officials -- 
but no members of Congress, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 2011, 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/04/obama-talks-
immigration-with-officials----but-no-members-of-congress/1; Julie Mason, Presi-
dent Obama Pushes Immigration Overhaul, POLITICO.COM (MAY 10, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/54696.html;.  For an analysis of previ-
ous congressional proposals on comprehensive immigration reform; PRESIDENT 
OBAMA ON COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obama-
comprehensive-immigration-reform (last visited July 17, 2011). See Shoba Si-
vaprasad Wadhia, Policy and Politics of Immigrants’ Rights, supra note 56; Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration: Mind Over Matter, 5 U. OF MD. L. J. ON RACE, 
RELIGION, GEND. & CLASS 201 (2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346586. 
 62. Memorandum from Denise A. Vanison, et al, to Alejandro Mayorkas, on 
Administrative Alternatives to Comprehensive Immigration Reform (undated) (on 
file with author), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/memo-on-
alternatives-to-comprehensive-immigration-reform.pdf. 
 63. Id. at 10–11. 
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not to pursue removal from the U.S. of a particular 
individual for a specific period of time . . . .  Were 
USCIS to increase significantly the use of deferred 
action, the agency would either require a separate ap-
propriation or independent funding stream.  Alterna-
tively, USCIS could design and seek expedited ap-




B. Congressional Criticism of Deferred Action  
Following the “leak” of the draft USCIS memo, select members 
of Congress freed themselves from working on a legislative solution 
and instead criticized the Department for its modest exercise of pros-
ecutorial discretion.  Notably, in a congressional hearing dated 
March 9, 2011, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) interrogated DHS 
Secretary Janet Napolitano about a memorandum drafted by a staff 
member at USCIS containing, among other things, a discussion 
about the use of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in par-
ticular.
65
  The Secretary indicated that the Department had made 
roughly 900 deferred action grants, juxtaposing the agency’s 
395,000 removals during the same time period.
66
  Pro-immigration 
advocates were stunned by the record low number of actual deferred 
action grants in contrast with the previous Administration.
67
  For 
example, the American Immigration Lawyers Associationwrote to 
the Secretary:  “We are concerned that in your testimony on March 9 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding prosecutorial dis-
cretion, you highlighted that the number of cases where discretion 
was favorably exercised was very small, suggesting that your de-
partment is discouraging and limiting its exercise.”68  Following the 
  
 64. Id. 
 65. Department of Homeland Security Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security).  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Letter from AILA and Immigration Council to Janet Napolitano, DHS Secre-
tary, 1 (Apr. 6, 2011), available at 
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Senate hearing, La Opinion, the largest Hispanic newspaper in the 
United States, reported that DHS granted deferred action to only 542 
individuals.  The pro-immigration group America’s Voice pulled 
together a chart below based on the data from La Opinion and con-
cluded:  “According to our calculations, the Bush Administration 
averaged 771 deferred action grants and 301,418 deportations from 
2005-2008, while the Obama Administration averaged 661 deferred 
action grants and 391,348 deportations its first two years in office . . 
. .”69   
 
The publication of the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion 
spurred a new wave of congressional criticism against the agency’s 
use of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in particular.  On 




 69. Dara Lind, La Opinion: Obama Has Granted a Record Low Number of De-
ferred Actions to Immigrants, AMERICA’S VOICE (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/entry/la_opinion_obama_has_granted_a_recor
d_low_number_of_deferred_actions. 
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introduce the “HALT (Hinder the Administration’s Legalization 
Temptation) Act” and issued a related “Dear Colleague” letter.70  
The HALT Act was introduced in July 2011 in both the House of 
Representatives and Senate and, among other provisions, would pre-
vent DHS from granting deferred action as a matter of prosecutorial 
discretion and “suspend” the handful of discretionary remedies 
available under the immigration laws for compelling cases.
71
  The 
politics behind the HALT Act are plentiful and illustrated in part by 
the fact that the bill expires on January 21, 2013, at the end of Presi-
dent Obama’s first term.72  The HALT Act was the centerpiece of a 
hearing in the House Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Immigration Pol-
icy and Enforcement on July 26, 2011.
73
   
Like with Lamar Smith and congressional members who support 
the HALT Act, the ICE union criticized the Morton Memo on Prose-
cutorial Discretion, calling such policies a “law enforcement night-
mare” and “just one of many new ICE policies in queue aimed at 
stopping the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws in the United 
States . . . .  Unable to pass its immigration agenda through legisla-
tion, the Administration is now implementing it through agency pol-
  
 70. “Dear Colleague” letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Comm. Chair-
man, to members of Congress (June 23, 2011), available at 
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Smith_DearColleague.pdf. 
 71. Id. at 2–3.  See also Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation 
Act (HALT Act), H.R. 2497, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2497ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr2497ih.pdf; 
Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation Act (HALT Act), S. 1380, 
112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112s1380is/pdf/BILLS-112s1380is.pdf.  On a historical note, in 1999, Representa-
tive Lamar Smith went on record supporting prosecutorial discretion by co-
authoring a letter from select members of Congress to the immigration agency.  
For a copy of the letter and commentary about Rep. Smith’s reverse position on 
prosecutorial discretion, see Editorial, The Forgetful Mr. Smith, NY TIMES, July 
12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/opinion/13wed3.html. 
 72. See “Dear Colleague” letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Comm. 
Chairman,  supra note 70, at 3; see also Hearing Information: Hearing on H.R. 
2497, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_07262011_2.html (last visited July 31, 
2011). 
 73. Hearing Information: Hearing on H.R. 2497, supra note 72. 
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icy.”74  The union’s president, Chris Cane, testified at the July 26, 
2011, hearing which attacked the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial 




Adding fuel to the fire, Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas) accused 
DHS of operating a secret policy of dismissing high priority immi-
gration cases as a matter of prosecutorial discretion after his staff 
reviewed a series of internal memoranda and emails retrieved by the 
Houston Chronicle.
76
  On July 5, 2011, House Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Lamar Smith (R-Texas) and Homeland Security Sub-
committee Chairman Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.) sent a letter to Secre-
tary Janet Napolitano chronicling the release of various draft and 
official agency memoranda on prosecutorial discretion and express-
ing concerns that these memos are being used to “circumvent Con-
gress and use executive branch authority to allow illegal immigrants 
to remain in the United States.”77  On July 13, 2011, and citing to the 
Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, Orrin Hatch, former 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, joined Sen. Jeff Ses-
  
 74. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Agent’s 
Union Speaks Out on Director’s “Discretionary Memo” Calls on the public to take 
action, 1 (June 23, 2011), available at http://www.iceunion.org/download/286-
287-press-release-pd-memo.pdf. 
 75. Immigration Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration 
Policy and Enforcement and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of Chris Crane, President, National Immigration and Customs En-
forcement Council 118 American Federation of Government Employees), availa-
ble at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Crane07262011.pdf.  Beyond the 
scope of this article but noteworthy are Crane’s remarks about the importance of 
training, and the ostentatious lack of training or guidance field officers received on 
the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion prior to its publication.  
 76. See Susan Carroll, Report: Feds downplayed ICE case dismissals; Docu-
ments show agency had approval to dismiss some deportation cases, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, June 27, 2011, 5:30 AM, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/7627737.html; Susan Carroll, 
Cornyn presses Napolitano over immigration case dismissals, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, June 28, 2011, 5:30 AM  
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/7631394.html. 
 77. Letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Comm. Chairman, and Robert 
Aderholt, Homeland Security Subcomm. Chairman to Janet Napolitano, DHS 
Secretary, 1 (July 5, 2011), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/Administrative%20Amnesty.pdf. 
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sions (R-Ala.) and four more Republican colleagues in urging U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to stop trying to 
“grant administrative amnesty to millions of illegal aliens” and to 
start enforcing immigration laws.
78
 
C. Congressional Support for Deferred Action 
Deferred action has not been contentious with every Member of 
Congress.  Select Members of Congress have taken positions sup-
porting the executive branch’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
For example on April 13, 2011, 22 U.S. Senators sent a letter to 
President Obama urging him to grant deferred action to qualifying 
DREAM Act students who are not a law enforcement priority to 
DHS.
79
  The letter states:  
We would support a grant of deferred action to all 
young people who meet the rigorous requirements 
necessary to be eligible . . . under the DREAM       
Act. . . .  We strongly believe that DREAM Act stu-
dents should not be removed from the United States, 
because they have great potential to contribute to our 
country and children should not be punished for their 
parents’ mistakes.80   
In their letter, the Senators are critical of the Department’s lack 
of a process for applying for deferred action and the fact that many 
DREAM Act students are unaware of this form of relief.
81
  On the 
  
 78. Press Release, Sen. Orrin Hatch, Hatch, Senate Colleagues Press U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement to Enforce Immigration Laws (July 13, 2011), 
http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ContentRecord_id=86f43fd7-
bb7c-4d03-8bb8-f83ea8468843. 
 79. Letter from Harry Reid, Senator, et al., to President Barack Obama, 2 (Apr. 
13, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/53014785/22-Senators-Ltr-
Obama-Relief-for-DREAMers-4. 
 80. Id.  For an example of a DREAM Act student granted deferred action, see 
Michigan Student's Deportation Put On Hold, Warren Student Wants To Gradu-
ate, Continue Schooling At University Of Michigan, CLICKONDETROIT.COM (last 
updated May 25, 2011, 9:36 AM), 
http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/28010704/detail.html. 
 81. Letter from Harry Reid, Senator, et al., to President Barack Obama, supra 
note 79, at 2. 
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heels of this letter, Senator Charles Schumer, a Democrat from New 
York and Chair of the Judiciary Committee remarked in another let-
ter to DHS: 
According to a March 2, 2011 memorandum of John 
Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs En-
forcement, ICE only has the funding to remove 
400,000 individuals per year.  Given that this entire 
number can be filled by criminal aliens and others 
posing security threats, it makes eminent sense to fo-
cus ICE's enforcement efforts on these criminals and 
security threats, rather than non-criminal populations.  
On a daily basis, my office receives requests for assis-
tance in many compelling immigration cases.  These 
cases often involve non-criminal immigrants such as: 
(1) high-school valedictorians and honor students 
who did not enter the country through their own voli-
tion and yet are being deported solely for the illegal 
conduct of their parents; (2) bi-national same-sex 
married couples who are being discriminated against 
based on their sexual orientation who would other-
wise be able to remain in the United States if they 
were in an opposite-sex marriage; (3) agricultural 
workers who perform back-breaking labor and are 
providing for their families; and (4) immigrant par-
ents with U.S. citizen children, whose deportation 
will only lead to increased costs to the states in foster 
care and government benefits.
82
 
On June 28, 2011, Senator Al Franken (D-MN) indicated that he 
would be sending his own letter to the Department in support of de-
ferred action for DREAM Act students, remarking, “I'd like to let 
everyone know that today I'll be sending a letter, my own letter, to 
the president in support of deferred action . . . .  I think it is the least 
  
 82. Letter from the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration to Janet Napoli-
tano, DHS Secretary (Apr. 14, 2011), available at 
http://arnolaw.blogspot.com/2011/04/letter-from-senate-judiciary.html. 
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that we can do to stop this injustice from getting any worse.”83  And 
on July 21, 2011, seventy-five Democratic members from the House 
of Representatives sent a letter to President Obama critical of Repub-
lican efforts to freeze executive branch authority by introducing leg-
islation like the HALT Act.
84
  Likewise, Democratic members of the 
House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement ex-
pressed their opposition to the HALT Act at the July 26, 2011, hear-
ing and the importance of preserving the few discretionary remedies 
available under the immigration laws, like deferred action.  Rep. Zoe 
Lofgren (D-CA) expressed her disbelief that Congress would waste 
so much time on a bill like the HALT Act and pointed to the unin-
tended human consequences if the legislation were enacted.
85
  
Meanwhile, Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) focused on the politics of the 
HALT Act noting that “[The HALT Act] is not an attack on the 
Presidency, but an attack on the President himself.”86  
D. Public Activities and Support for Prosecutorial Discretion  
The political context for, and lack of, transparency of deferred 
action is also illustrated by the public’s response to the various agen-
cy memoranda and legislative reactions to prosecutorial discretion in 
the last two years.  This section illustrates the activities and positions 
on prosecutorial discretion by select bar associations, journalists, and 
immigration advocates since the 2010 publication of The Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law.  Relying on its 
  
 83. DREAM Act Education for Alien Minors: Hearing on S. 952 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 112th Cong. 27 (2011) (statement of Sen. Al Franken). 
 84. Letter from Democratic members from the House of Representatives to Pres-
ident Barack Obama, 1 (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.gutierrez.house.gov/images/stories/HALT_Act_letter_complete.pdf. 
 85. See The Hinder the Administration's Legalization Temptation Act: Hearing 
on H.R. 2497 before the Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3–4 (2011). 
 86. Id. at 5.  For a short analysis of the HALT Act and related politics, see Mar-
shall Fitz, HALT the Insanity: New Hyperpartisan Bill Tries to Handcuff the Pres-
ident, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 25, 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/halt_act.html. 
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groundbreaking report on immigration adjudications,
87
 the American 
Bar Association testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
May 17, 2011, highlighting the importance of prosecutorial discre-
tion:  
Prioritization, including the prudent use of prosecuto-
rial discretion, is an essential function of any adjudi-
cation system.  Unfortunately, it has not been widely 
utilized in the immigration context.  There are nu-
merous circumstances in which a respondent is not 
likely to be removed regardless of the outcome of the 
legal case.  The most obvious cases are those where 
the respondent is terminally ill or is the parent or 
spouse of someone who is critically ill, but there are 
other examples where it is clear from the circum-
stances at the beginning of the process that the inter-
ests in removing the respondent will almost certainly 
be outweighed on humanitarian or other grounds.
88
 
The American Immigration Lawyers Association and its sister 
group, American Immigration Council, have also published infor-
mation about prosecutorial discretion.  To illustrate, the Immigration 
Council published a practice advisory for immigration attorneys 
about the strategies and forms of prosecutorial discretion, as well as 
an article on the highs and lows of the June 30, 2010, Morton 
Memo.
89
  Similarly, the American Immigration Lawyers Association 
conducted a nationwide poll of its more than 11,000 members re-
garding their experiences with prosecutorial discretion requests to 
  
 87. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/immigration.html (last visited 
July 18, 2011).  
 88. Statement of Karen T. Grisez, supra note 51, at 7. 
 89. See Prosecutorial Discretion: How to Advocate for Your Client, LEGAL 
ACTION CENTER (June 24, 2011), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/practice-
advisories/prosecutorial-discretion-how-advocate-your-client; Wadhia, Reading 
the Morton Memo, supra note 40, at 4.  See also Just The Facts, IMMIGRATION 
POLICY CENTER, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/executive-action-
resource-page (last visited July 18, 2011). 
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ICE,
90
 and received more than 200 responses.  AILA sent a follow 
up letter to DHS remarking: 
Many of these cases involve people who, if deported, 
would be separated from U.S. citizen and Lawful 
Permanent Resident immediate family members who 
depend on their noncitizen relatives for care and sup-
port.  Several cases involve people who suffer from 
severe medical conditions; who are victims of domes-
tic violence, trafficking or other serious crimes; or 
who are serving as valuable witnesses in criminal 
prosecutions.  Many are students whose academic 
performance shows great promise for their ability to 
contribute to this nation in the future.
91
 
Similarly, the former president of AILA, David Leopold, pub-
lished an article in Bloomberg Law Reports describing the concept 
of prosecutorial discretion and authorities of the Executive Branch to 
grant deferred action in compelling cases.
92
  Likewise, attorney 
Margaret Stock testified about the importance of deferred action at 
the July 26, 2011, hearing on the HALT Act by showcasing the 
types of individuals that would be deported without the discretionary 
relief the HALT Act seeks to “halt.”93  One example provided by 
Professor Stock in her written testimony included:  
An example of a person who will be harmed immedi-
ately by passage of the HALT Act is Fereshteh Sani, 
a woman whose father and mother were executed by 
  
 90. Prosecutorial Discretion Survey, AILA (2011), 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/LMMTBSG. 
 91. Letter from AILA and Immigration Council to Janet Napolitano, DHS Secre-
tary, supra note 68, at 2. 2 (Apr. 6, 2011).  
 92. David W. Leopold, What Legal Authority Does President Obama Have to 
Act on Immigration?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, 2 (May 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=35404. 
 93. Executive Immigration Enforcement Limitations: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement and the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Margaret D. Stock, Adjunct Professor, Uni-
versity of Alaska Anchorage), available at  U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 3–4 (2011) 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Stock07262011.pdf. 
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Iranian government officials in 1988.  Fereshteh has 
been in the United States since 1999, and has gradu-
ated from college and medical school here; she is cur-
rently a resident in Emergency Medicine at Bellevue 
Hospital in New York City.  She is in the United 
States on a grant of deferred action, which is sched-
uled to expire on September 14, 2011.
94
  
Like the private bar associations, and following the administra-
tive and legislative roadblocks on immigration during the first two 
years of the Obama Administration, public policy think-tanks, advo-
cacy groups, and law firms have published affirmative positions on 
deferred action and prosecutorial discretion more generally.  For 
example, the Migration Policy Institute highlighted the importance 
of prosecutorial discretion in a 2011 report highlighting actions for 
the Executive Branch in the absence of legislative reform.
95
  Specifi-
cally, the MPI report recommends that the Government develop a 
uniform set of enforcement priorities and, in cases of lesser priority, 
exercise prosecutorial discretion in the form of deferred action with 
work authorization.
96
  Similarly, the 10,000 membership organiza-
tion NAFSA: Association of International Educators highlighted the 
importance of prosecutorial discretion in a May, 2011, press release 
stating: 
We urge President Obama to exercise his executive 
authority and act now to direct the Department of 
Homeland Security to implement such a deferred-
action policy.  This is a matter of humanitarian neces-
sity, and it would represent the kind of national lead-
ership that is needed to move the one-sided, enforce-
ment-first debate about immigration that has so far 
  
 94. Id. at 9. 
 95. Donald M. Kerwin, Doris Meissner & Margie McHugh, Executive Action on 
Immigration: Six Ways to Make the System Work Better, MIGRATION POLICY 
INSTITUTE, 14–19 (2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/administrative 
fixes.pdf. 
 96. Id.     
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poisoned prospects for what is ultimately needed – 
comprehensive reform – in a more fruitful direction.97 
Law firms, law clinics, and advocacy organization have also as-
sembled practical tools for noncitizens potentially eligible for de-
ferred action.  In May 2011, Duane Morris, Maggio Kattar, and 
Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson School of Law published 
a practitioner’s toolkit addressing private bills and deferred action, 
underscoring the dearth of information about how to go about apply-
ing for deferred action and the heightened importance of pursuing 
these forms of relief.
98
  Developed to help immigration judges, law-
yers, public officials, and nonprofit groups navigate what has be-
come a last-resort option for those facing deportation, the toolkit 
includes “Best Practices” from attorneys around the country; a sum-
mary of the laws and procedures governing deferred action and pri-
vate bills; sample letters of support, exhibit lists, and legal briefs; 
and selected resources.
99
  In June, 2011, Asian Law Caucus, Educa-
tors for Fair Consideration, DreamActivist.org, and National Immi-
grant Youth Alliance published a resource manual titled “Education 
Not Deportation: A Guide for Undocumented Youth in Removal 
Proceedings.”100  This manual is “intended to aid certain undocu-
mented students and their lawyers to fight effectively throughout a 
removal (deportation) proceeding.”101  The production of these 
toolkits underscores the absence of quality information about the 
deferred action program and procedures.   
The growing chorus of immigration attorneys, advocates, and 
media outlets speaking about the importance of prosecutorial discre-
tion in immigration law is striking and in part responds to their frus-
tration about the stalemate in Congress over immigration.  While I 
  
 97. Press Release, NAFSA: Association of International Educators, NAFSA 
Statement on Immigration Reform and Undocumented Students (May 10, 2011), 
http://www.nafsa.org/PressRoom/PressRelease.aspx?id=26639. 
 98. New toolkit sheds light on lesser known immigration remedies, PENN STATE 
LAW (May 17, 2011), http://law.psu.edu/news/immigration_toolkit. 
 99. Id. 
100. Guide for Undocumented Youth in Removal Proceedings, ASIAN LAW 
CAUCUS, http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/alc/publications/guide-for-
undocumented-youth-in-removal-proceedings/ (last visited July 18, 2011). 
101.   Id. at 6. 
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disagree with those who label the recent agency memoranda on 
prosecutorial discretion as a “backdoor amnesty” or alternative for 
legislation like the DREAM Act, I nevertheless believe that some 
potential beneficiaries of immigration legislation are likely to carry 
qualities that resemble the equities listed in the O.I., Meissner 
Memo, and Morton Memoranda.  As such, it should not be surpris-
ing that some would-be DREAM Act beneficiaries for example, are 
also deserving of deferred action.
102
 
IV. ANALYZING DEFERRED ACTION CASES 
A.  Previous Empirical Studies 
Leon Wildes is an attorney who represented the former Beatle 
John Lennon in his immigration case.
103
  Believing that Lennon’s 
prosecution by INS was politically motivated, Wildes (on behalf of 
Lennon) corresponded with INS for more than one year to gain in-
formation about INS’ deferred action program.104  Conceding that 
records pertaining to the deferred action were not specifically ex-
empt from the FOIA, and moreover existed as an identifiable “class 
or category” of documents, INS provided Wildes with case histories 
of 1843 deferred action cases granted by INS.
105
  Upon examining 
the 1843 cases, Wildes calculated that deferred action was granted to 
individuals subject to a spectrum of deportability or excludability 
grounds, and suggested that equitable factors played are far greater 




102.   For a longer explanation about why prosecutorial discretion cannot serve as 
a substitute for legislative reforms, see Wadhia, supra note 3, at 297–98. 
103.  E.g., Wadhia, supra note 3, at 246-47; Wildes, The Litigative Use of the 
FOIA, supra note 2, at 42. 
104.  Wildes, The Litigative Use of the FOIA, supra note 2, at 45; Wildes, The 
Nonpriority Program Part I, supra note 2; Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Part 
II, supra note 2; Wildes, The Cultural Lag, supra note 2, at 280.  See generally 
Wildes, The Operations Instructions, supra note 2 (discussing the importance of 
John Lennon’s immigration case as the first to provide the public with knowledge 
of the Nonpriority Program). 
105.  Wildes, The Litigative Use of the FOIA, supra note 2, at 48–49. 
106.  Id. at 52–53 & n.35. 
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In Wildes’s study, more than 98% of the deferred action cases 
granted by INS involved one of the following discernable factors 
that drove the agency’s decision: individuals who were of tender age 
or elderly age; mentally incompetent; medically infirm; or would be 
separated from their family members if deported.
107
  Separation from 
family was the greatest category of cases analyzed by Wildes that 
led to a favorable decision by the agency.
108
  Moreover, a U.S. citi-
zen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) family member was in-
volved in more than 80% of the 1,843 cases granted.
109
  This data 
indicates that the presence of a family member with long-term ties to 
the United States was important, but not always determinative, to 
whether or not the agency granted deferred action.   
Seeking to update his 1979 article on deferred action, Wildes 
filed FOIA requests to the Central, Western, and Eastern Regional 
offices of USCIS for all records of cases in which deferred action 
was granted.
110
  Wildes received information from the Central and 
Western regions, which cumulated to 499 deferred action cases.
111
  
Wildes received some cases that were denied or discontinued.
112
  
The data indicated that nearly 89% of the deferred action cases fur-
nished to Wildes were granted.
113
  Like his 1979 study, Wildes 
found that USCIS was granting deferred action based on a strict set 
of criteria as opposed to arbitrarily.
114
  Specifically, the cases granted 
deferred action fell within seven specific categories: (1) separation 
of family; (2) medically infirm; (3) tender age; (4) mentally incom-
petent; (5) potential negative publicity; (6) victims of domestic vio-
lence; and (7) elderly age.
115
  In both studies, Wildes found that sep-
aration from a family member was an overriding factor in deferred 
  
107.  Id. at 53 & n.36. 
108.  Id. at 53, 58. 
109.  Id. at 60 & n.45. 
110.  Wildes, A Possible Remedy, supra note 2, at 825. 
111.  Id. at 826–27. 
112.  Id. at 826 & n.44 (“The calculation assumes that all relevant cases, whether 
approved, denied, or removed by the two regions, were released and forwarded to 
[Wildes].”).  
113.  Id. at 826. 
114.  Id. at 830. 
115.  Id.   
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action grants.
116
  The second greatest operating factor for cases 
granted in the 2003 study was medical infirmity, which according to 
Wildes included “life-threatening” situations such as HIV and can-
cer.
117
  These figures indicate that both in 1976 and in 2003, the 
agency relied predominantly on humanitarian criteria in granting 
deferred action.
118
    
B.  FOIA Requests to ICE 
I filed my first FOIA request to ICE on October 6, 2009, request-
ing for all records and policies involving prosecutorial discretion.  A 
reply letter from ICE was sent on November 19, 2009, acknowledg-
ing receipt of the request, assigning a control number to the request, 
and stating that ICE had “queried the appropriate program offices 
within ICE for responsive records.”119  On November 30, 2009, an-
other letter was sent from ICE stating that the request was “overly 
broad” and requesting clarification.120  On December 19, 2009, less 
than thirty days later, a clarifying letter was sent to ICE.
121
  On Feb-
ruary 3, 2010, the status of the request was “administratively 
closed.”122  According to ICE, my request was closed on December 
30, 2009, because there was “no response to letter requesting addi-
tional information.” 
I sent a new FOIA request to ICE on March 30, 2010, containing 
an expanded request for information on prosecutorial discretion and 
  
116.  Wildes, A Possible Remedy, supra note 2, at 831 & n.64. 
117.  Id. at 831–32. 
118.  Id. at 832. 
119.  Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., U.S. Im-
migration & Customs Enforcement, to author (Nov. 19, 2009) (assigning to the 
request reference number: 2010FOIA1069) (on file with author). 
120.  Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., U.S. Im-
migration & Customs Enforcement, to author (Nov. 30, 2009) (on file with au-
thor). 
121.  Letter from author to Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Dec. 19, 2009) (on file with author). 
122.  Letter from U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement to author (Feb. 3, 
2010) (on file with author). 
File: Wadhia - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V2 Created on: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM Last Printed: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM 
2012 DEFERRED ACTION AND IMMIGRATION LAW 35 
deferred action.
123
  No response from ICE was received.  On July 12, 
2010, a follow up e-mail was sent to ICE for a status update on the 
March 30, 2010, request, but no response was received.
124
  On No-
vember 9, 2010, I followed up with a contact in ICE to inquire about 
the status of my request and learned that ICE had no record of the 
request.
125
  On November 24, 2010, ICE e-mailed me with a clarify-
ing question about whether I preferred open or closed cases as well 
as detained and non-detained cases.
126
  In January, 2011, I received a 
yellow package from ICE holding a single compact disc containing a 
single chart identifying only a handful of active deferred action cases 
between the years of FY 2003 and 2010.
127
  This chart is pasted be-
low and, if complete, indicates that ICE granted less than 500 de-
ferred action cases between 2003 and 2010.  I contacted ICE by 
phone and e-mail in February, 2011, and at the time learned that ICE 
had mistakenly sent the disc without a letter.
128
  ICE electronically 
sent a formal decision letter on February 9, 2011.
129
  The letter itself 
indicated that a full search of the ICE Office for Enforcement and 




123.  Letter from author to U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., U.S. Immigra-
tion & Customs Enforcement & U.S. Customs & Border Protection (Mar. 30, 
2010) (on file with author).  
124.  E-mail from Nicole Comstock, Research Assistant of author, to U.S. Immi-
gration & Customs Enforcement (July 12, 2010, 11:20 EST) (on file with author). 
125.  E-mail from Andrew Strait, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to 
author (Nov. 9, 2010, 12:51 EST) (on file with author). 
126.  E-mail from Ryan McDonald, Paralegal Specialist, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, to author (Nov. 24, 2010, 11:07 EST) (on file with author). 
127.  U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, NO. OF ACTIVE CASES 
GRANTED DEFERRED ACTION STATUS SINCE CY 2003, (undated) (on file with 
author). 
128.  E-mail from Ryan McDonald, Paralegal Specialist, Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, to author (Feb. 2011, 12:27 EST) (“Attached is a copy of the ICE 
response letter that was supposed to be included with the CD.”) (on file with au-
thor). 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id.  Note that the letter itself was dated December 17, 2010. 
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C. Chart Provided by ICE: Number of Active Cases Granted Deferred   
Action Status Since CY 2003 
            
CY Detained Non Detained Total     
2003 0 117 117     
2004 0 68 68     
2005 0 62 62     
2006 0 64 64     
2007 0 71 71     
2008 0 39 39     
2009 2 34 36     
2010 1 15 16     
Total 3 470 473     
            
As of IIDS November 29, 2010 as provided by the Statistical 
Tracking Unit.   
Data only reflects Deferred Action Granted and Case Status Active 
(i.e. open cases).  Data cannot be reported for Deferred Action Granted, 
Case Status inactive (i.e. closed cases).  
 
Concerned in part that ICE did not make a complete search, I 
filed an appeal with ICE on March 29, 2011, hoping to receive more 
data.
131
  As to the adequacy of its search, the appeal letter highlight-
ed the data Wildes was able to retrieve in the late 1970s and early 
2000s and also indicated: 
Responsive records [to my FOIA request] exist that 
were not included in ICE’s response.  Specifically, 
records on deferred action are required to be main-
tained under the Detention and Removal Operations 
and Procedure Manual § 20.8(c).  The Manual pro-
  
131.  Letter from author to Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 
29, 2011) (appealing adverse decision in FOIA matter 2011FOIA1845) (on file 
with author). 
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vides that all deferred action considerations be sum-
marized using a Form G-312 and placed in the alien’s 
A-file.  Decisions regarding grants and denials of de-
ferred action must also be in writing and signed by an 
agency official making the determination.  Production 
of these records would be responsive to the original 
FOIA request, even if redaction were required to pro-
tect an individual’s privacy interests . . . .132 
On May 18, 2011, I contacted ICE by telephone and learned that 
ICE had not received the FOIA appeal.  As such, the appeal was en-
tered into ICE’s system on May 18, 2011, nearly two months after 
the original appeal was filed.
133
  On May 24, 2011, I communicated 
for up to an hour with an ICE FOIA officer in charge of appeals to 
clarify the procedural history of my FOIA request and confirmed 
that the date of my original appeal letter was filed within sixty days 
of ICE’s original decision letter, so that my appeal would be pre-
served.
134
  Hearing nothing for two months, I called the ICE FOIA 
office on July 27, 2011 to inquire about the status of my appeal.  I 
was told that I would need to speak with the same ICE FOIA officer 
and thereafter provided a callback number with the expectation that I 
would receive a return phone call.
135
  In a letter dated September 27, 
2011 ICE denied my appeal regarding the adequacy of ICE’s 
search.
136
  According to the letter, ICE conducted an additional 
  
132.  Id. 
133.  Letter from Susan Mathias, Chief, Gov’t Info. Law Div., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, to author (May 18, 
2011) (“On behalf of the Chief for the Government Information Law Division, we 
acknowledge your appeal request of 2011FOIA1845 and are assigning it number 
OPLA11-181 for tracking purposes.”) (on file with author). 
134.  Phone Conversation with Mark Graff, Freedom of Info. Act Officer, U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (May 24, 2011) (discussing 
2011FOIA1845). 
135.  Phone Call to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Freedom of Info. 
Act Office (July 27, 2011) (attempting to discuss 2011FOIA1845 and OPLA11-
181). 
136.  Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., U.S. Im-
migration & Customs Enforcement, to author (Sep. 27, 2011) (regarding matter 
number OPLA-181, 2011FOIAFOIA14736) (on file with author). 
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search on remand of the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor 
(OPLA) and found that no records were responsive.
137
 
D.  FOIA Requests to USCIS 
My initial FOIA request to USCIS headquarters was made on 
October 6, 2009.
138
  A letter was sent from USCIS on October 9, 
2009, which acknowledged receipt of my request and assigned it a 
control number.
139
  On October 28, 2009, a second letter was sent 
from USCIS, requesting additional information about the records 
sought.
140
  More specifically, USCIS required the inquiry be made 
regarding particular individuals with their consent.  On February 9, 
2010, the FOIA request was closed.
141
   
I made a second and more detailed FOIA request on March 30, 
2010.  USCIS sent a response on April 1, 2010, assigning the request 
a control number.
142
  As of August 31, 2010, my FOIA request was 
listed on the USCIS website as 65 out of 219 requests pending in 
Track 2.  After nearly one year without a response, I discussed my 
request with the Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services’ 
Ombudsman on February 25, 2011; the office, which had initiated a 
study of deferred action processing, reviewed and inquired with 
USCIS about the status of the FOIA request.
143
  On March 11, 2011, 
I received an e-mail from a USCIS FOIA officer stating “[we have] 
received most of the records responsive to your request and are con-
tacting an additional program office to determine if additional rec-
  
137.  Id. 
138.  Letter from author to U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv. (Oct. 6, 2009) 
(on file with author).   
139.  Letter from T. Diane Cejka, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., to 
author (Oct. 9, 2009) (assigning FOIA request control number: NRC2009057166) 
(on file with author).  
140.  Letter from T. Diane Cejka, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., to 
author (Oct. 27, 2009) (concerning control number NRC2009057166) (on file with 
author). 
141.  Id. 
142.  Letter from T. Diane Cejka, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., to 
author (Apr. 1, 2010) (on file with author).  
143.  E-mail from Gary Merson, Office of the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Serv. Ombudsman, to author (Feb. 25, 2011, 18:41 EST) (on file with author). 
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ords exist on this subject.”144  Three months later, in a letter dated 
June 17, 2011, USCIS responded to my FOIA request with three 
compact discs, which together contained a cover letter, a 270-page 
PDF document containing data, and several spreadsheets listing sta-
tistical data.
145
  A subsequent conversation with the FOIA officer 
responsible for implementing the FOIA request indicated that de-
ferred action records from FY 2003 through FY 2010 were requested 
from every USCIS regional service center and field office.
146
  Be-
cause USCIS does not formally track information about deferred 
action, the data I received was variable depending on the office and 
location.  It is neither possible to conclude that the records I received 
were complete, nor is it possible to analyze the entirety of what I 
received, because there is great disparity between how the data on 
deferred action is collected and recorded by each office, if at all.  
The legible data I received on deferred action came in one of three 
variations: (1) spreadsheet or chart; (2) Form G-312s Deferred Ac-
tion Case Summary; and/or (3) written request or memorandum by 
the applicant or attorney seeking deferred action.
147
  To manage the 
data and create a meaningful qualitative analysis, I did not incorpo-
rate data that was unclear or cases where deferred action appeared to 
serve as a pre-adjudication form of relief – i.e., those who filed ap-
plications for relief as a victim of trafficking, crime, or abuse (a.k.a., 
prospective U or T visa holders).
148
   
  
144.  E-mail from Tembra Greenwood, Nat’l Records Ctr., Freedom of Info. Act 
Div., to author (Mar. 11, 2011, 13:48 EST) (referring to NRC2010021400) (on file 
with the author).  The email also estimated the author’s FOIA request would be 
completed in approximately three months.  Id.  
145.  Letter from Jill A. Eggleston, Dir., Freedom of Info. Act Operations, U.S. 
Customs & Immigration Serv., to author (June 17, 2011) (on file with author); see 
infra note 161.  
146.  Phone Conversation with Tembra Greenwood, Nat’l Records Ctr., Freedom 
of Info. Act Div. (June 28, 2011). 
147.  Eggleston, supra note 145. 
148.  For an overview of how deferred action serves as important form of relief 
for abuse victims who are eligible and awaiting trafficking related visas, see Letter 
from organizations to Reps. Lamar Smith, John Conyers, Elton Gallegly, & Zoe 
Lofgren (July 25, 2011) (on file with author). 
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More than 100 cases involved Haitian citizens who entered the 
United States after the 2010 earthquake.
149
  Much of the data on cas-
es involving Haitians applying for deferred action after the earth-
quake lacked information about the factual information and/or out-
come.  About fifty of these cases included some information, mostly 
in the form of copies of deferred action request letters submitted, and 
involved individuals who: entered the United States as B-2 visitor; 
were transported to the United States; had at least one family mem-
ber already living in the United States; had their home destroyed 
during the earthquake; and/or entered the United States with minor 
children.
150
  In some cases, the applicant was forced to separate from 
a spouse or child in Haiti.
151
  Below is a sampling of the case sum-
maries provided in some of the USCIS logs: 
 
 Thirteen-year-old girl came to the United States 
with her seventeen-year-old sister; house de-
stroyed by earthquake; living with United States 
Citizen (USC) aunt and legal guardian in the 




 Entered United States on B-2 visa with two 
daughters, one a USC; owned warehouse in Haiti 
that was destroyed by the earthquake; many cus-




 Entered United States with twelve-year-old USC 
son as evacuees after earthquake in Haiti; home 





149.  Eggleston, supra note 145. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. 
152.  Letter from [name removed] to Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 7, 2010) (on 
file with author). 
153.  Affidavit in Support of Deferred Action Status for [name removed] (June 
22, 2010) (on file with author).  
154.  Letter from [name removed] to A. Castro, Acting Field Office Dir., Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. (June 30, 2010) (on file with author). 
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 Entered with twelve-year-old daughter; left Haiti 
to escape from man who had sexually abused his 
daughter; the criminal escaped from jail when it 
was damaged in earthquake and told subject he 
was going to abuse daughter again.
155
 
 Infant USC daughter; family home destroyed in 
earthquake; wife and one child entered the United 
States as evacuees; children have health problems 




 Transported to United States with three minor 
children as evacuees following earthquake; one 
child is a USC; home severely damaged; husband 




 Transported to United States with three minor 
children as evacuees following earthquake; infant 
child is a USC; family home and business de-
stroyed in quake; subject is diabetic and requires 




In July 2011, the DHS Ombudsman recognized the influx in 
post-earthquake cases from Haiti: “Over the past year, stakeholders 
expressed concerns to the Ombudsman’s Office regarding the de-
layed processing of numerous deferred action requests submitted by 
Haitian nationals following the earthquake in January 2010.”159   
  
155.  Letter from [name removed] to Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 10, 2010) (on 
file with author). 
156.  Affidavit in Support of Deferred Action Status for [name removed] (June 
21, 2010) (on file with author). 
157.  Affidavit in Support of Deferred Action Status for [name removed] (June 
25, 2010) (on file with author). 
158.  Letter from [name removed] to A. Castro, Acting Field Office Dir., Dep't of 
Homeland Sec. (June 30, 2010).    
159.  January Contreras, Deferred Action: Recommendations to Improve Trans-
parency and Consistency in the USCIS Process, OFFICE OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
& IMMIGRATION SERV. OMBUDSMAN, 6 (2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb-combined-dar.pdf. 
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The remaining qualitative data within the 270-page PDF docu-
ment included 118 identifiable deferred action cases.  It was difficult 
to label a case as tender or elder age because much of the data lacked 
identifiers.  However, when a field included the word “minor,” “in-
fant,” or a specific age (e.g., eighty-nine-year-old), the case was cal-
culated as involving tender or elder age for purposes of this analysis.  
It should also be mentioned that some of the cases approved, pend-
ing, or unknown contained little to no factual information and, as a 
consequence, were not identified as bearing any of the “positive” 
factors listed above.
160
  The outcomes for many of these cases were 
unknown because the field was blank or there simply was not a field 
in the log maintained by a particular office.  Many of the cases also 
had outcomes that were marked as “pending.”  Of the 118 cases, 
fifty-nine (59/118 or fifty percent) were pending or unknown; forty-
eight (48/118 or 40.7%) were granted; and eleven (11/118 or 9.3%) 
were denied.
161
   
Among the 107 cases approved, pending, or unknown, fifty 
(50/107 or 46.7%) involved a serious medical condition, nineteen 
(19/107 or 17.8%) involved cases in which the applicant had USC 
family members, twenty-two (22/107 or 21.5%) involved persons 
who had resided in the United States for more than five years, and 
thirty-two (32/107 or 29.9%) cases involved persons with a tender or 
elder age.
162
  Many of these cases (29/107 or 27.1%) involved more 
than one “positive” factor.163  For example, many of the cases 
(10/107 or 9.3%) involved both a serious medical condition and 
USC family members.
164
  Likewise, many of the cases (21/107 or 
19.6%) involved both tender or elder age and a serious medical con-
dition.
165
   
Among the forty-eight granted cases, twenty-four (24/48 or 50%) 
involved a serious medical condition; ten (10/48 or 20.8%) involved 
  
160.  See supra Part IV.A.   
161.  Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs (June 17, 2011) (providing 
dozens of documents including letters to the agency for deferred action, agency 
responses, and regional offices’ case logs) (on file with author).    
162.  Id. 
163.  Id.; see supra Part IV.A.   
164.  Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs, supra note 161.  
165.  Id. 
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cases in which the applicant had USC family members; four (4/48 or 
8.3%) involved persons who had resided in the United States for 
more than five years; and thirteen (13/48 or 27.1%) cases involved 
persons with a tender or elder age.
166
  Many of these cases (12/48 or 
25%) involved more than one “positive” factor.167  For example, four 
(4/48 or 8.3%) of the cases involved both a serious medical condi-
tion and USC family members.  Likewise, ten (10/48 or 20.8%) of 




Below is a sampling of approved cases involving a serious medi-
cal condition, tender or elder age, and/or the presence of United 
States Citizen family members: 
 Eighty-nine-year-old man suffering from Parkin-
son’s disease, dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, 
glaucoma, hypertension, and hypotension 
 Twenty-two-year-old with Downs Syndrome un-
able to care for self; daughter of an LPR 
 Entered U.S. as an EWI; --------- was in an auto-
mobile accident that rendered him in a quadriple-
gic in a vegetative state that requires continuous 
care and supervision; Mother has Temporary Pro-
tected Status, living in FL. 
 Cerebral palsy victim, Korean orphan with USC 
sponsors  
 Father of eight-year-old child receiving extensive 
neurological treatment  
 Father of eleven-year-old USC daughter with se-
vere heart problems  
 Mother of eleven-year-old USC daughter with se-
vere heart problems  
 Mother of U.S. national child with progressive 
muscular dystrophy  
  
166.  Id. 
167.  Id.; see supra Part IV.A. 
168.  Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs, supra note 161. 
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 Forty-seven-year-old schizophrenic B-2 overstay; 
son of LPR parents; USC siblings 
169
 
E.  Survey Monkey  
As a supplement to my FOIA requests, I circulated an informal 
survey to immigration attorneys and advocates using Survey Mon-
key.
170
  Specifically, my survey was sent by e-mail to the following 
listservs: National Immigration Project, Detention Watch Network, 
Immigration Professors, and other immigration advocates on May 
22, 2011, May 31, 2011, and June 17, 2011.
171
  Most of the ques-
tions included in the survey were “multiple choice” and limited to a 
series of possible answers.  The survey included the following ques-
tions:  
 
1. Have you ever applied for deferred action or prosecutorial dis-
cretion to USCIS or ICE? 
2. Which agency did you apply to? 
3. What type of action did you request?  
4. In what geographic region did your request take place?  
5. What was the result of your request? 
6. What was the sex of your client?  
7. What factors did your client have in their favor?  
  
169.  Id. 
170.  DEFERRED ACTION & PROS. DISCRETION, 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5DYY68K (last visited July 18, 2011). 
171. The body of the e-mail indicated: 
I am continuing to research the agency's use of prosecutorial 
discretion and deferred action in particular since FY 2003.  This 
research builds upon writing projects that are available here: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=103
5598.  At the moment, I have pending FOIA requests with the 
DHS sub-agencies and have otherwise been informally collect-
ing information from advocates about their experiences.  If you 
have applied for deferred action with DHS on or after FY 2003, 
PLEASE CONSIDER TAKING THIS 5 MINUTE SURVEY 
(one survey for each case): 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5DYY68K. 
E-mail from author to Immigration listservs (May 22, 2011; May 31, 2011; June 
17, 2011) (on file with author). 
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 Tender age 
 Elderly 
 Medical condition 
 Psychological condition 
 DREAM Act eligible 
 Widow of USC 
 Military service 
 Involvement in community 
 Has children who are USCs 
 Has other family members who are USCs 
 Has little or no family in native country 
 Has resided in the United States for over ten years 
 Has resided in the Unites States since childhood 
 Strong showing of community support 
 Media coverage of the case 
8. What negative factors negative factors did your client have 
working against them? 
 Criminal history   
 Medical condition   
 Psychological condition   
 History of drug abuse   
 Has ties to a gang    
 Has only resided in the United States for a short time 
 Has little or no family in the United States   
 Could be easily removed to native country (or other 
country)  
 Has ties to a foreign organization at odds with the 
U.S. government.
172
    
9.  Other Comments  
 
The survey yielded seventy-two responses, fifty-eight of which 
were deferred action cases.
173
  Despite the small sample size, the 
surveys are revealing about the primary factors that drive deferred 
  
172.  Id. 
173.  Survey Monkey Results, Deferred Action & Pros. Discretion (on file with 
author). 
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action requests.  Among the fifty-eight deferred action cases, nine 
were denied, thirty-five were granted, seven were pending, one was 
unknown, and six lacked a response from the agency.
174
  Notably, 
twenty-four of the thirty-five granted cases involved more than one 
positive factor.
175
  Below are a few case examples where a deferred 
action grant involved more than one positive factor:   
 
 Case # 1 -  Psychological condition  
Involvement in community 
Has children who are USCs 
Has other family members who are USCs 
Has little or no family in native country 
 Case # 2 - Medical Condition 
Has children who are USCs 
Has other family members who are USCs 
Has resided in the United States for over ten 
years 
Strong showing of community support 
Media coverage of the case 
 Case # 3 - Medical Condition 
Psychological condition 
Has children who are USCs  
Has resided in the United States for over ten 
years 
 Case #4 - Medical Condition 
Psychological condition 
Has children who are USCs 
Has other family members who are USCs 
 Case #5 - Tender Age 
Has children who are USCs 
Has little or no family in native country 
Has resided in the United States for over ten 
years 





175. Id.; see supra Part IV.A. 
176. Survey Monkey Results, supra note 173. 
File: Wadhia - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V2 Created on: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM Last Printed: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM 
2012 DEFERRED ACTION AND IMMIGRATION LAW 47 
 
Notably, the positive factors indicated for the nine cases denied 
were largely similar to the cases granted.
177
  Moreover, only two of 
the nine cases involved criminal history, insofar as such a history 
might have caused a negative decision.
178
  In fact, six of the nine 
cases denied included more than one of the positive factors reflected 
in the granted cases.
179
  This raises a concern that cases involving 
similarly relevant facts resulted in a different outcome, which inter-
sects with the forthcoming discussion about the importance of trans-
parency.  The foregoing analysis of deferred action cases obtained 
by USCIS and through Survey Monkey indicate that five equitable 
factors influence deferred action grants: (1) serious medical condi-
tion; (2) tender or elder age; (3) long term residence in the United 
States; (4) presence of USC children in the United States; and/or (5) 
other USC family members in the United States.
180
 
While the grant rate for deferred action cases might cause alarm 
for those who challenge the deferred action program as an abuse of 
executive branch authority, it should be clear that regardless of out-
come, the number of deferred action cases considered by ICE and 
USCIS are quite low.  These numbers suggest that the real concern 
lies in the fact that many non-citizens who meet the common criteria 
utilized by the agency in assessing deferred action lack access or 
knowledge about deferred action, the process for applying, and basic 
eligibility requirements.  Even doubling the number of legible de-
ferred action grants produced by USCIS and ICE between 2003 and 
2010 (118 plus 946) yields less than 1,100 cases, or less than 130 
cases annually!  One can appreciate this exceptionally low number 
when comparing it to the unauthorized immigrant population (10.8 
million
181
); number of persons removed in 2010 (387,000
182




179. Id.; supra Part IV.A. 
180. Survey Monkey Results, supra note 173; see supra Part IV.A. 
181.  Michael Hoefer et al., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Estimates of the Unau-
thorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2010, 1 
(2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf. 
182.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 
2010 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 2 (2011), 
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The next section challenges the agency’s lack of transparency 
about the deferred action program and offers specific recommenda-
tions for rulemaking and greater transparency.  The goals behind 
these recommendations are not geared primarily towards escalating 
the grant rate to unmanageable levels, but rather to ensuring that 
immigrants bearing equities similar to the ones already utilized by 
the agency in assessing deferred action requests are given equal con-
sideration.   
V.  THE DEFERRED ACTION PROGRAM LACKS TRANSPARENCY 
From the earliest days, when prosecutorial discretion was re-
vealed in 1975, up to the present, the immigration agency has lacked 
transparency about both the various forms of prosecutorial discretion 
and deferred action in particular.
184
  Whereas the agency has contin-
ued to include its authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in 
various memoranda and manuals, it has been less willing to offer 
statistics on the individuals granted discretionary relief under prose-
cutorial discretion, or the method by which one should go about ap-
plying for such relief.
185
  The data above also shows that attorneys 
who are fortunate enough to figure out the deferred action process 
and make a formal request are not always guaranteed a response by 
the Department.   
The agency’s lack of transparency about deferred action is also 




183.  Statement of Juan P. Osuna, supra note 39, at 2.  Note that while the actual 
testimony suggests that 325,326 proceedings were receiving by EOIR in FY 2010, 
I have reduced the number to accommodate those proceedings which are unrelated 
to formal removal proceedings such as bond proceedings and motions proceed-
ings.   
184.  See Wildes, The Litigative Use of the FOIA, supra note 2, at 42-43. 
185. The most revealing information about deferred action is included in the 
memoranda and is limited to informing the public and authorization officials that 
deferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion.  See e.g. Meissner Memo, 
supra note 19. 
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ferred action cases from ICE, CBP, and USCIS.
186
  Seeking to up-
date Wildes’s studies, I filed multiple FOIA requests to the DHS 
sub-agencies (ICE, CBP, and USCIS) beginning in October 2009, 
inquiring first about all records and policies pertaining to prosecuto-
rial discretion decisions, and later narrowing the request to deferred 
action cases.
187
  The intermittent letters by the DHS sub-agencies 
seeking clarification and/or closing the request altogether sheds light 
on the difficulty in obtaining basic information about prosecutorial 
discretion generally and deferred action in particular.
188
   
Notably, USCIS conducted a complete search to produce a 270-
page PDF document in addition to statistical charts about deferred 
action.
189
  However, the data itself was variable and incomplete be-
cause the agency does not have a clear tracking mechanism for de-
ferred action cases.  Moreover, not only did the data I receive come 
more than one year after my initial request, I had the assistance of 
the DHS Ombudsman, who agreed to help move my FOIA request; 
like the deferred action process itself, my experience illustrates how 
an accidental phone call with a government official can influence 
outcomes more readily than merit and the following of vague proce-
dures.
190
   
  
186.  See supra Part IV.B. 
187.  Letter to Sub-agencies, supra note 121; Letter from author to U.S. Immigra-
tion & Customs Enforcement (Oct. 6, 2009) (on file with author). 
188.  See supra Part IV.B for my procedural history in obtaining information from 
USCIS and ICE.  Note that my FOIA request with CBP was ultimately closed 
without any data.  My initial request was made to CBP on October 6, 2009.  On 
October 26, 2009, an email reply was sent from Ada Symister of CBP’s Office of 
International Trade, requesting clarification.  A reply to Ms. Symister was sent on 
November 4, 2009.  On November 9, 2009 an additional e-mail was sent from 
Elissa Kay of CBP’s Office of International Trade seeking further clarification on 
the information sought in the FOIA request.  A response was sent to Ms. Kay on 
November 11, 2009.  There was no additional response from CBP.  On March 30, 
2010 I made a second, more detailed FOIA request to CBP.  On April 29, 2010 
CBP responded to the request stating that the information sought is under the pur-
view of USCIS and that the request should be forwarded there. 
189. Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs, supra note 161.  
190. According to the DHS Ombudsman, USCIS Headquarters has recently begun 
tracking deferred action requests in local offices.  See Contreras, supra note 159, 
at 5. 
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In the case of ICE, the result of a single chart detailing active 
cases in which deferred action was granted was thin on detail about 
the facts involved in each case, the process by which deferred action 
was considered, the evidence presented to meet eligibility for de-
ferred action, and the conditions under which each case was granted.  
Even if I were to concede that the data provided by ICE constitutes 
the universe of active deferred action cases granted between 2003 
and 2010, this raises questions about ICE’s recordkeeping regarding 
inactive cases, the number of applications filed and received by ICE, 
the number of cases denied by ICE, the number of cases initiated as 
a deferred action requested and treated as something else (i.e., stay 
of removal), and so on.  Tracking this data is important both for the 
agency and the public.
191
   
In the case of CBP, I can only speculate that CBP lacks a specific 
policy about how it executes prosecutorial discretion generally and 
deferred action particularly.
192
  My FOIA experience also suggests 
that CBP lacks data about prosecutorial discretion grants or denials.  
Together, these limitations give CBP the lowest transparency marks 
within DHS.
193
  The next section explores the normative benefits of 
  
191. Notably, the Secretary of DHS testified on June 28 about her willingness to 
share data about deferred action cases with the Senate Judiciary Committee.  In 
response to a question posed by Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) she noted:  
Senator, we've had an awful lot of correspondence with the 
committee on various issues.  But I think the point of the ques-
tion is would we agree to some oversight of how the deferred ac-
tion process is being administered?  And the answer is we want 
to be very transparent about how we are exercising the authori-
ties the statutes give us.  
DREAM Act Education for Alien Minors: Hearing on S. 952 Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration, Refugees & Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id= 
3d9031b47812de2592c3 baeba604d881. 
192. See supra note 148. 
193. My research is consistent with recent findings by the DHS Ombudsman with 
regards to transparency and the deferred action program within USCIS:   
  Stakeholders lack clear, consistent information regarding 
requirements for submitting a deferred action request and 
what to expect following submission of the request.  There 
is no formal national procedure for handling deferred ac-
tion requests. When experiencing a change in the type or 
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transparency generally and codifying a regulation about deferred 
action in particular. 
A.  Why Transparency Matters 
Transparency about deferred action matters and is premised first 
on the acceptance that an officer or agency’s decision about deferred 
action is an adjudicatory function that demands the same kind of 
analysis that would be given to other immigration benefits that fall 
within the formal adjudicatory framework.  There is no shortage of 
literature scrutinizing an administrative process against a set of nor-
mative values.
194
  Administrative law scholar Roger Cramton has 
  
number of submissions, local USCIS offices often lack the 
necessary standardized process to handle such requests in a 
timely and consistent manner.  As a result, many offices 
permit deferred action requests to remain pending for ex-
tended periods.  Stakeholders lack information regarding 
the number and nature of deferred action requests submit-
ted each year; and they are not provided with any infor-
mation on the number of cases approved and denied, or the 
reasons underlying USCIS’ decisions.   
Contreras, supra note 161, at 1. 
194.  See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary 
Step Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 263-64 (2002) 
[hereinafter Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders]; Lenni B. Benson, Making 
Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process 
Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 40 
(2006-2007); Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of 
S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 112 
(1963) [hereinafter Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform]; Roger C. 
Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 
VA. L. REV. 585, 592-93 (1972); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Admin-
istrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 80 (1983) (arguing for a “precision calculus” 
framework for interpreting adjudicative rules, which leads to more transparency 
and accessibility); Family, supra note 19, at 598 (examining the problem of divert-
ing individuals away from immigration administrative adjudication); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the 
Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1313-14 (1986); David A. Martin, 
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1247, 1322 (1990); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudica-
tion: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 419-21 
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identified “accuracy,” “efficiency,” and “acceptability” as goals for 
evaluating administrative designs.  Immigration law scholar Steven 
Legomsky has also explored “consistency” in asylum adjudications 
along with the criteria identified by Cramton.
195
  Administrative and 
immigration law scholar Lenni Benson has examined transparency 
as a separate process value.
196
  For purposes of this article, I analyze 
the values of equal justice, accuracy, consistency, efficiency, and 
acceptability in the deferred action context.  I chose these criteria 
because I believe that the lack of transparency in deferred action un-
dermines these values and underscores why transparency is so im-
portant.  I concede that many of the values analyzed below are over-
lapping in that one bears relationship to another.   
B.  Equal Justice
197
 
Transparency can promote a fair process and more equitable out-
comes.  One of the most important benefits of transparency is per-
haps the least obvious: the reduction to the number of requests for 
deferred action that are never made because the individual who may 
qualify is unaware of the process.  To my knowledge, no public 
memoranda from DHS have authorized employees to automatically 
consider cases for deferred action before they enter the system, if at 
all.  The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion takes a step in 
the right direction by indicating that it is “preferable for ICE officers, 
agents, and attorneys to consider prosecutorial discretion in cases 
without waiting for an alien or alien’s advocate or counsel to request 
a favorable exercise of discretion.”198   
There is also a fairness component to the practical uncertainty 
faced by non-citizens.  It is possible that a potential beneficiary of 
deferred action is aware of the process but is unable to decide 
  
(1972) (discussing the inconsistencies broad discretionary power imposes on ad-
ministrative decisions in an immigration context). 
195. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform, supra note 194, at 111–12; 
Legomsky, supra note 194, at 1313. 
196. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 262–63. 
197.  While Cramton intentionally analyzes accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability 
as an alternative to “fairness” or “due process,” I think it is appropriate to mention 
how the current deferred action program undermines these latter values.      
198.  Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 5. 
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whether he should hire an attorney and apply for it.  Moreover, an 
applicant for deferred action who never hears back from the agency 
is unable to plan his affairs because he is unaware about the outcome 
of his case.  Even where the individual has been granted deferred 
action and given a legitimate basis for work authorization, a U.S. 
employer might be unsure about whether to hire the individual be-
cause of the secrecy or in-limbo nature of deferred action.  All of 
these scenarios have a fairness component that should be considered 
when thinking about the protections and greater certainty of other 
discretionary remedies. 
Finally, and less clear, is the subject of due process, which at the 
very least requires that the interests at stake bear some relationship 
to the procedures.
199
  In deferred action cases, the interest at stake for 
the non-citizen is significant.  If deferred action is denied or never 
considered, the consequences could include arrest, detention, depor-
tation, or a combination of the three.  The deferred action program 
also lacks notice.  As it stands, many people who apply for deferred 
action have hired a lawyer who is familiar with the process.
200
  
Whereas these interests lie at the top of the “hierarchy” of actions 
that deprive the individual of liberty, the scenario is complicated by 
the fact that most individuals applying for or eligible to apply for 
deferred action do not have a formally recognizable immigration 
status.
201
  On the other hand, many such individuals have resided in 
the United States for a meaningful number of years.  The Supreme 
Court has more than once concluded that “[o]nce an alien enters the 
country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause 
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, 
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or per-
  
199.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).  There, the Supreme Court 
distinguished the need for a preliminary hearing in administering disability bene-
fits from welfare benefits on the basis that a welfare recipient warrants a hearing 
because he could be deprived of the “very means by which to live while he waits.”  
Id. at 340. 
200.  On the other hand, the government might view that greater notice will in-
crease the incentives to utilize deferred action as a delay tactic.  See Paul R. 
Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1170 
(1984). 
201.  Id. at 1150. 
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manent.”202  Furthermore, the Court compared deportation to “ban-
ishment or exile.”203   
C.  Efficiency 
Efficiency refers to the time and expense invested in a particular 
process.  Professor Cramton explains efficiency “emphasizes the 
time, effort, and expense of elaborate procedures.  The work of the 
world must go on, and endless nitpicking, while it may produce a 
more nearly ideal solution, imposes huge costs and impairs other 
important values.”204  On the one hand, one might think that the cur-
rent deferred action design is superbly efficient because it lacks the 
costs associated with an application form or process, lacks review by 
an administrative or judicial appellate body, lacks recordkeeping or 
reporting by the Department, and so on.  On the other hand, the lack 
of transparency about the deferred action program has resulted in 
congressional inquiries about the Department’s recordkeeping, re-
search by the DHS Ombudsman on how to improve deferred action 
processes, and lengthy FOIAs between the author and the Depart-
ment.  Similarly, the Department’s review of voluminous submis-
sions by attorneys fortunate enough to know about deferred action 
and the ensuing correspondence that takes place between Depart-
ment employees and attorneys because of the lack of guidance or 
process conceivably results in great costs to the government.  In 
short, the lack of transparency about deferred action has resulted in 
enormous monetary expenses and personal time for the Department.   
D.  Accuracy 
Accuracy means that once an adjudicator interprets relevant fac-
tors, the law that is applied to the factors is correct and the conclu-
sion is consistent with the sources of law.  To Professor Benson, 
  
202.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001). 
203.  Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“We resolve the doubts in 
favor of that construction because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the 
equivalent of banishment or exile. . . . [W]e will not assume that Congress meant 
to trench on [the individual’s] freedom beyond that which is required by the nar-
rowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”). 
204. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform, supra note 194, at 112. 
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“[a]ccuracy ensures the law is being carried out, and not undermined 
through error or fraud.”205  Practically, it is difficult to measure the 
accuracy of the current deferred action program because the gov-
ernment does not maintain basic information about the process and 
its decisions.  Moreover, the deferred action program undervalues 
the accuracy objective, because it prevents potentially eligible indi-
viduals from applying for deferred action and immunizes officers 
from liability when a deferred action is denied or disregarded alto-
gether.  If a person is denied deferred action but has facts similar to a 
family member who was granted deferred action in a neighboring 
region, it can be identified as inaccurate.  Similarly, if the same per-
son never applies for deferred action because she does not have a 
lawyer and is otherwise unaware of the program, accuracy is also 
disregarded.  When a person has the opportunity to consult with pub-
lished criteria after being denied deferred action, he is able to under-
stand the reasons for this denial and, if appropriate, enable the agen-
cy to catch errors.
206
   
E.  Consistency 
To Professor Benson, “[c]onsistency, not only of outcome, but 
also of treatment along the way, is required to maintain fairness 
among and between participants, and thus, is necessary to foster re-
spect for and trust in the system.”207  Americans also value con-
sistency because it treats similarly situated people equally.  In sharp 
contrast, decisions about deferred action are uneven and in some 
cases unknown to attorneys and advocates who file applications.
208
  
Transparency about the deferred action process promotes consisten-
cy by directing potential applicants to a similar procedure at the front 
  
205.  Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263. 
206. E-mail from Stephen Legomsky to author (July 16, 2011, 19:41 EST) (on file 
with author). 
207. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263. 
208. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 159, at 5 (“USCIS does not have a nation-
wide process for acknowledging the receipt of deferred action requests, but many 
USCIS offices have implemented a local method for logging submissions and 
acknowledging their receipt.  Other offices do not issue a written acknowledge-
ment of receipt for deferred action requests.”); Wadhia, supra note 36; Survey 
Monkey, supra note 170. 
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end, and ensuring more consistent outcomes at the back end.
209
  The 
importance of transparency and consistency in deferred action cases 
was also highlighted by DHS’ own Ombudsman in 2007 when he 
remarked: 
[M]inimal measures, including tracking requests for 
deferred action and regular review by USCIS head-
quarters of the requests and the determinations made, 
would help to ensure that there is no geographic dis-
parity in approvals or denials of deferred action re-
quests and that like cases are decided in like manner.  
. . . .   
If implemented, this recommendation would make 
USCIS more efficient by tracking requests for de-




Consistency is also enhanced when officers are held accountable 
for their actions.  My own belief is that a more transparent process 
for deferred action can have a disciplinary effect on the adjudicator 
and, as a consequence, advance the quality and consistency of deci-
sions on deferred action.  A similar argument has been set forth by 
Professor Legomsky in his writings about the benefits of agency re-
view when he remarks: 
I believe that the mere prospect of review can have a 
sobering effect on administrative officials.  Most of 
us do not like to be embarrassed, especially in our 
work.  When we know that someone might be scruti-
  
209. Legomsky contends that the arguments supporting an agency’s head to re-
view adjudicative decisions for the purpose of promoting consistency fall short, 
since there are other alternatives that are no less consistent.  See Stephen H. Le-
gomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Con-
sistency, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 413, 458 (2007) [hereinafter Legomsky, Learning 
to Live with Unequal Justice]; see also Legomsky, supra note 194. 
210.  Recommendation from Prakash Kharti, Ombudsman, U.S. Customs & Im-
migration Serv., to Dr. Emilio T. Gonzalez, Dir., U.S. Customs & Immigrtion 
Serv., 3–4 (Apr. 6, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsman 
_RR_32_O_Deferred_Action_04-06-07.pdf. 
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nizing our work and testing our reasons, we have an 
extra incentive to approach our decisions careful-
ly. . . .
211
   
F.  Acceptability 
Acceptability is not so much focused on whether a particular 
process is in fact fair or acceptable, but rather on whether the proce-
dure is perceived to be fair by members of the public and parties to 
the process.
212
  Here, my specific recommendation for promulgating 
a rule on deferred action subsumes the “so what” of transparency in 
that rulemaking itself ensures that members of the public are provid-
ed with an opportunity to provide input before a rule is made final.  
More predictable rules and procedures about deferred action also 
promote acceptability because non-citizens and attorneys can make 
reliable plans based on an articulated set of criteria proffered by the 
agency and, over time, a body of case law to indicate how these cri-
teria are applied to individual cases.
213
   
From the agency’s perspective, transparency about deferred ac-
tion and publication of a regulation may be more trouble than it is 
worth.  “Transparent rules tend to spotlight a value choice.  Oppo-
nents of that choice will attack the agency's action, forcing the agen-
cy to expend its own resources for defense.  Rules having low trans-
parency thus become more attractive, since they conceal value 
choices.”214  The agency might argue that transparency by the De-
partment about prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in partic-
ular could result in a storm of objections by restrictionists and other 
members of the public who equate deferred action to an “amnesty” 
that received no support by Congress.
215
  In response to any concern 
that a published rule on deferred action is akin to a “backdoor legali-
zation” program, I would opine that a legislative scheme is distin-
  
211.  See, e.g., Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 206, 
458; Stephen H. Legomsky, Refugees, Administrative Tribunals, and Real Inde-
pendence: Dangers Ahead for Australia, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 245 (1998). 
212.  See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 194, at 1313. 
213.  Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 209, at 426–
28. 
214.  Diver, supra note 194, at 106. 
215.  See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 36, at 6 & n.22. 
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guishable and more generous in both its application and its benefits.  
For example, the published rule proposed in this article would be 
limited to non-citizens who possess specific qualities and criteria and 
enable the individual to be legally present in the country and apply 
for work authorization.
216
  In contrast, a legalization program in-
cludes the benefits of temporary residence, work authorization, per-




The concern that a published rule on deferred action may attract 
future illegal migration is a legitimate one, but this concern can be 
addressed by catering the rule to people who meet specific qualify-
ing criteria and, if appropriate, setting an annual numerical cap.  
Since the agency already employs specific criteria for considering 
deferred action cases, spelling out the criteria in a published rule 
would not necessarily create a new or objectionable policy for the 
Department, but would advance the goals of equal justice, accuracy, 
consistency, efficiency, and acceptability.  Achieving these values 
requires transparency about how deferred action works as well as a 
newly codified regulation subject to the “notice and comment” re-
quirement of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).
218
   
Nevertheless, the immigration agency has previously held reser-
vations about promulgating rules under the APA.  The best illustra-
tion of this was in 1979, when the former INS proposed a rule that 
would have explained the various criteria utilized by officers in de-
termining the discretionary component of “adjustment of status” and 




216.  See infra Part VI.  
217. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th 
Cong. (2011); Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy 
Act of 2007, H.R. 1645, 110th Cong. (2007).  
218.  See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2011).   
219.  See Factors To Be Considered in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion, 
44 Fed. Reg. 36,187, 36,191 (June 21, 1979) (proposing 8 C.F.R. 245.8); see also 
Diver, supra note 194, at 94; Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 3, at 284-86 
(“Several provisions of these proposed regulations would have required a favora-
ble exercise of discretion in the absence of adverse factors.  For example, with 
regard to the exercise of discretion under the former 212(c) waiver, the rule identi-
fied the following factors for consideration in the exercise of discretion: ‘alien is 
likely to continue type of activity which gave rise to the grounds of excludability; 
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In most cases, to qualify for adjustment of status, the non-citizen 
must generally have a qualifying relationship with a U.S. employer 
or family member, be admissible to the United States, and have a 
visa immediately available to him or her.
220
  In addition to meeting 
these statutory criteria, the applicant must qualify for adjustment as a 
matter of discretion.  The discretionary component has not been de-
fined in the statute or the regulations, but at one time was articulated 
in the former INS O.I. as requiring “substantial equities.”221  The 
published rules would have given clarity to the discretion exercised 
in adjustment of status and other cases but was instead repealed in 
1981 because the INS feared that:  
 
[l]isting some factors, even with the caveat that such 
list is not all inclusive, poses a danger that use of 
guidelines may become so rigid as to amount to an 
abuse of discretion . . . .  The INS also argued that the 
rules would “eliminate discretionary powers by con-
verting discretionary powers into a body of law.”222 
 
INS’ fear of litigation is not merely theoretical, but underscored by a 
relating memorandum to then INS Commissioner Lionel J. Castillo 
who remarked:  
[T]he proposals embodied in this draft would subject 
the Service to a constant barrage of spurious appeal 
[sic] by Immigration attorneys on the basis of seman-
tics proposed to be injected into the regulations.  
They subvert Government to the vagaries of attorney 
dilatory tactics and would appear to tie our hands 
  
alien has a history of criminal, immoral, narcotic, or subversive activity; act giving 
rise to grounds of excludability was relatively recent; no unusual hardship would 
accrue to alien or family members if the waiver is denied.’”) (citations omitted). 
220.  INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006). 
221.  IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, O.I. 
§ 245.5d(5), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-
0-0-1/0-0-0-53690/0-0-0-60138/0-0-0-60293.html; see also Diver, supra note 194, 
at 93. 
222.  Wadhia, supra note 3, at 284–85 & n.238. 
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completely in the cobwebs of endless liturgical [sic] 
dialogue.
223
   
The agency’s desire for flexibility and fear of litigation are not 
new, and have historically served as a basis for less transparency.
224
  
But the argument from an agency that regulatory language providing 
factors to assess discretionary adjudication would limit its flexibility 
is unpersuasive.  First, the Department has the ability to craft a rule 
that both lists criteria and adopts a discretionary component.  In fact, 
there are many humanitarian-like remedies that operate in this way.  
For example, cancellation of removal is a remedy codified in the 
statute in 1996 that is available to eligible non-LPRs and LPRs who 
meet specific statutory requirements, such as continuous physical 
presence and residence in the United States for a specified time peri-
od, or hardship to a qualifying family member who is either a green 
card holder or USC, among other requirements.
225
  Similarly, the 
O.I., Meissner Memo, and Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discre-
tion all include a listing of factors that should be considered by im-
migration officers, agents, or attorneys, but qualifies that list of rele-
vant factors as illustrative.  More important, the factors used by the 
agency to make decisions about deferred action are identifiable and 
operate as a “benefit” for those non-citizens fortunate enough to 
have a knowledgeable attorney who can apply for it.   
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  Recognize Deferred Action as a Rule 
Deferred action should be published as a rule in the Federal Reg-
ister.
226
  The regulation should be subject to a 120-day public notice 
  
223.  Diver, supra note 194, at 95 (citing to Memorandum from [name and posi-
tion deleted], INS, to Lionel Castillo, Commissioner, INS (September 12, 1978), at 
1.). 
224.  See, e.g., Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263–
64. 
225.  INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006). 
226.  See Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 3, at 286; See also 
AILA’s comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s implementation of 
Executive Order 13563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.”  Special 
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and comment period.  The regulatory language as proposed must 
recognize both the humanitarian and economical bases for deferred 
action.  The advantages of rulemaking promotes the values that are 
so interconnected with principles of administrative law, including 
but not limited to transparency, consistency, acceptability, and ac-
countability.  As described by Professor Legomsky: 
[R]ulemaking has tremendous advantages over adju-
dication as a vehicle for policy formation.  These ad-
vantages include broader public input, notice to Con-
gress, avoidance of adjudicative hearings to resolve 
issues of legislative fact, avoidance of litigating the 
same issues repeatedly, more enforceable rules, clear-
er advance notice of allowable and prohibited con-
duct, fairer applicability of the rules to similarly situ-
ated individuals at different points in time, and the 
opportunity for affected individuals to make policy 
submissions before the rule is adopted.
227
 
In addition to advancing various process values, rulemaking 
would assist with narrowing the various factors used by adjudicators 
to determine whether deferred action should be granted.  An analysis 
  
thanks to the AILA Interagency Liaison Committee. AILA Doc. No. 11041463 
(“Guidance on deferred action was contained in the now withdrawn INS Operating 
Instructions.  Though the relief is still available, there are currently no regulations 
that would facilitate a more meaningful and consistent application of prosecutorial 
discretion in context of deferred action.  We ask that such regulations be promul-
gated.”).  
227.  Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 209, at 459; 
see also id. at 423 & n.67 (“Inconsistent procedures and inconsistent employment 
criteria for adjudicators were among the problems that inspired the Administrative 
Procedure Act”).  For an insightful description, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-
Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 
65-68 (1996).  These problems were also the focus of a superb consultants’ report 
prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States.  Paul R. Verkuil 
et al., Report For Recommendation 92-7: The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in 
2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND REPORTS 777 (1992).  See also Recommendations and Statements of the Ad-
ministrative Conference, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,759 (Dec. 29, 1992) (codified at 1 C.F.R. 
pts. 305, 310) (recommending many of the reforms urged by the consultants’ re-
port). 
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of the data on deferred action cases indicate that decisions are based 
on distinguishable criteria and that a single regulation would only 
bolster the application of this criteria in like cases, and stave the in-
evitable abuse of discretion that stems from a system where cases are 
decided by different regional officers and without accountability.  
The benefit of using rules to guide discretionary decisions is not a 




Rulemaking is also cost-effective.  I believe the costs associated 
with rulemaking would be recovered by enabling immigration adju-
dicators to follow a clear rule.  Clearer rules on deferred action could 
also remove the costs associated with documenting every rationale 
and factor in a particular A-file, gaining approval from a supervisor 
before granting deferred action, or ICE attorneys having to review 
every NTA for sufficiency under the prosecutorial discretion guide-
lines.  Interestingly enough, the internal checks and balances created 
by the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, however im-
portant, are a costly endeavor that could be streamlined by crafting a 
rule limited to deferred action cases.  I also believe that implementa-
tion of a regulation would not particularly increase litigious costs 
but, to the contrary, infuse a level of internal quality control and in-
centive for immigration adjudicators to apply the rule faithfully.
229
  
The proposed rule should include information about the scope of 
deferred action, namely that it is a temporary benefit available to 
eligible non-citizens who meet specific criteria and who warrant de-
ferred action as a matter of discretion.  The agency should create a 
form for deferred action requests, and attach a nominal fee for pro-
cessing the form.  An applicant who is unable to pay a filing fee 
should be eligible to fill out a fee-waiver form.  The application 
should be filed to the Vermont Service Center or another regional 
Service Center.  By maintaining all applications at a specific service 
center, it will be easier for DHS to keep statistics and also adjudicate 
related requests for work authorization.  The rule should be discre-
  
228.  See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 194, at 421; Verkuil, supra note 200, at 1205–
06. 
229. Diver, supra note 194, at 95; Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Jus-
tice, supra note 209, at 463. 
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tionary and place the burden on the non-citizen to present substantial 
equities that may include: continuous residence in the United States 
for at least ten years; presence of a USC or LPR child, spouse, or 
parent in the United States; serious mental health condition or physi-
cal disability; and/or tender or elderly age. 
While my proposal provides concrete guidelines, it offers flexi-
bility for the Department to consider equally compelling factors not 
listed.  That said, my goal is not to “codify” previous memoranda 
like the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, but instead to 
create a discreet remedy in the form of deferred action that is based 
on an identifiable set of factors that (as illustrated by the data) the 
agency has relied upon for more than thirty years.  The Department 
will and should continue to follow the current memoranda on prose-
cutorial discretion when making prosecutorial decisions.  Deferred 
action is merely one slice of the scores of decisions that currently 
serve as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.   
Those who are denied deferred action should receive a written 
decision with reasons for the denial.  Written decisions promote ac-
curacy, consistency, and acceptability by allowing the applicant to 
be heard.  While written decisions would likely add costs onto the 
agency, these costs could be offset by the fees that accompany the 
new deferred action form and the current costs associated with the 
internal checks and reviews that accompany deferred action pro-
cessing. 
Those who are successful in obtaining a deferred action grant 
should be granted temporary residence for a renewable three-year 
period, work authorization, and permission to travel for good cause.  
A grant of deferred action should not lead to permanent residency, 
but neither should it prohibit a grantee from applying for a more 
permanent legal benefit if she is otherwise eligible.  The period dur-
ing which an individual is in deferred action status should be recog-
nized as a lawful status as is currently the case.
230
  If the newly pro-
  
230. See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director, Domes-
tic Operations Directorate, Lori Scialabba, Associate Director Refugee, Asylum 
and International Operations Directorate, Consolidation of Guidance Concerning 
Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 
 
File: Wadhia - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V2 Created on:  4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM Last Printed: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM 
64          UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 10 No.1 
posed regulation on deferred action needs alteration, the Department 
should make adjustments to the regulation “relying on exceptions, 
time extensions, variances, and waivers.”231   
B.  Publicize Information About Deferred Action  
The Department of Homeland Security should train immigration 
employees about the new rule.  Moreover, DHS should create a sys-
tem whereby every case that is brought to the Department’s attention 
is automatically considered for deferred action.  Alternatively, indi-
viduals who are facing removal before EOIR or DHS should be noti-
fied about their right to apply for deferred action before USCIS.  
Information about deferred action should be posted on the relevant 
DHS websites.  This information should include a step-by-step pro-
cess about how to apply for deferred action, basic eligibility re-
quirements, and related benefits.  If a policy is implemented whereby 
DHS automatically considered cases for deferred action, then such 
policy should be posted on the various DHS websites and also ac-
companied by a “Fact Sheet” in user-friendly English.232  Even if the 
procedures themselves are not codified as regulations, they should be 
published in the Federal Register.   
Finally, DHS must publish the facts of individual cases as well 
as decisions about deferred action and keep statistics about the cases 
in which deferred action is considered, denied, and/or granted.  Such 
statistics must be made part of the annual statistics published by 
  
of the Act, 42 (May 6, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/ 
Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/ revision_redesign_AFM.PDF 
231. Raising the Agency’s Grades – Protecting the Economy, Assuring Regulatory 
Quality and Improving Assessments of Regulatory Need, Subcomm. on Courts, 
Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (citing Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regu-
lation Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004) (state-
ment of Robert L. Glicksman)), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ 
pdf/Glicksman03292011.pdf. 
232.  As noted before, the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion takes a step 
forward by asking ICE employees to initiate decision on prosecutorial discretion 
without waiting for an affirmative request by an attorney.  Note however that the 
language does not create a mandate or “automatic” process nor does it imply that 
in all cases deferred action (which is but a sliver in the universe of ways in which 
prosecutorial discretion can be exercised) will be considered as the remedy.   
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DHS and also posted on the various websites.  DHS must publish the 
training officers receive on deferred action.  Cumulatively, publish-
ing information about the deferred action process, related decisions, 
statistics, and training programs will advance transparency and ac-
ceptability, while also providing the public with tools for measuring 
efficiency, accuracy, and consistency in deferred action cases.
233
 
VII.  APPENDIX: TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS  
Administrative Procedures Act – APA 
American Immigration Council – Immigration Council 
American Immigration Lawyers Association – AILA 
Board of Immigration Appeals – BIA or Board  
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties – CRCL 
Customs and Border Protection – CBP 
Deferred Action – DA 
Department of Homeland Security – DHS or Department 
Department of Justice – DOJ or Justice  
Doris Meissner, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion – Meissner 
Memo  
Executive Office for Immigration Review – EOIR 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement – ICE 
Immigration and Nationality Act – INA or the Act 
Immigration and Naturalization Service – INS 
John Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens – Morton Memo 
on Civil Enforcement Priorities  
John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent 
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for 
the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens – Morton 
Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion  
Notice to Appear – NTA  
Office of the Principal Legal Adviser – OPLA  
Operations Instruction – O.I. 
Prosecutorial Discretion – PD  
  
233.  See, e.g., Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263–
64. 
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United States Citizen – USC 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services – USCIS 
VII.  POSTSCRIPT  
This article was completed in July 2011.  Subsequently, on Au-
gust 18, 2011, the White House “announced” a policy whereby an 
interagency working group consisting of officials from DOJ and 
DHS would review 300,000 cases pending removal and as a matter 
of prosecutorial discretion administratively close cases that are 
deemed “low priority.”234  Without spelling out a legal vehicle or 
process, the announcement also suggested that individuals whose 
cases were successfully closed would be eligible for work authoriza-
tion.
235
  Thereafter, ICE issued a series of documents in November 
2011 to implement the August 18th announcement.236 Together, the-
se documents identified the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discre-
tion as the “cornerstone” for what officers should follow in making 
  
234.  Cecilia Munoz, Immigration Update: Maximizing Public Safety and Better 
Focusing Resources, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 18, 2011, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/immigration-update-maximizing-
public-safety-and-better-focusing-resources; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,  
Sivaprasad Wadhia on the White House’s Review of Removal Cases, 
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Sept. 4, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com 
/immigration /2011/09/shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia-on-the-white-houses-review-of-
removal-cases.html.   
235. Wadhia, supra note 234. 
236.  See Memorandum from Peter Vincent, Principle Legal Advisor, U.S. Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement, on Case-by-Case Review of Incoming and 
Certain Pending Cases (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib 
/foia/dro_policy_memos/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-pending-cases-
memorandum.pdf.; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, GUIDANCE TO ICE ATTORNEYS REVIEWING THE CBP, 
USCIS, AND ICE CASES BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos 
/guidance-to-ice-attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf; U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, NEXT STEPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION MEMORANDUM AND THE AUGUST 18TH ANNOUNCEMENT ON 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf. 
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prosecutorial discretion decisions; furnished an additional set of sub-
stantive criteria officers should use to making short term decisions 
about prosecutorial discretion; explained that every ICE officer au-
thorized to exercise such discretion would be trained by January 13, 
2012; launched a short-term process for reviewing select cases enter-
ing the immigration court or pending removal for prosecutorial dis-
cretion in the form of administrative closure; and initiated a special 
review of cases pending removal at the Denver and Baltimore immi-
gration courts.  A detailed analysis of these initiatives is beyond the 
scope of this article.  While there remain a number of outstanding 
and unresolved questions about these protocols237, the author 
acknowledges that the steps the Administration has taken improves 





237.  For example, many of these protocols sunset in January 2012; appear to be 
limited to non-detained cases; fail to address a specific procedure for individuals 
who lack counsel; appear to limit the immediately available forms of prosecutorial 
discretion to remedies that provide no independent basis for work authorization; 
seem to widen the list of “negative” factors ICE officers should consider in the 
short term as a basis for denying prosecutorial discretion; and provide no guaran-
tee or process for reviewing cases that result in a denial or creating a public record 
that includes a listing of cases considered, denied or granted prosecutorial discre-
tion. 
238.  For an analysis of the November 2011 documents and a related letter by the 
American Bar Association, see ALEXSA ALONZO & MARY KENNEY, DHS REVIEW 
OF LOW PRIORITY CASES FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (2011), available at  
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/DHS_Review_of_Low_Priorit
y_Cases_9-1-11.pdf; Letter from Thomas M. Susman, Director of ABA Govern-
mental Affairs Office, to John Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/uncategorized/2011/gao/2011dec15_prosecdiscreetion_l.authcheckdam.pdf  
